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In the contemporary increasingly globalized world, an aggregate of divergent 
interconnected rights of miscellaneous entities is always in a need of searching for a perfect 
internal balance among these rights.  
The same applies within the ambit of international investment law which has recently 
found itself in a desperate need of recalibration of the private and public rights.  
As a matter of fact, the investor’s protection, especially in the context of (indirect) 
expropriation, has grown into a sophisticated and strong tool represented by a network of 
countless IIAs. However, as it turned out, such practice had an unpleasant side effect, which 
lies in erosion of the state’s flexibility in performing its regulatory powers. Some of the scholars 
or commentators referred to this course of events as a “regulatory chill” or “regulatory freeze” 
which concerns the situations when the states are reluctant to adopt necessary welfare policies 
due to concerns of the prospective claims brought by investors on the grounds of indirect 
expropriation allegations.1  
Since in a modern international law the states as sovereigns must fulfil their obligations 
to maintain sustainable development, protect and preserve public order and health as well as 
act in accordance with other commitments within international relations, the problem of 
reduced regulatory flexibility can have unexpected repercussions in many different areas such 
as environment protection or human rights.2  
Followingly, as has been expressed by prof. Crawford, the need to balance the rights of 
investors and states in the frames of the investment protection is currently “one of the most 
significant challenges facing international investment law”.3  
 
 
1 SHEKHAR, Satwik. Regulatory Chill: Taking the Right to Regulate for a Spin. Indian Institute of Foreign Trade: 
Centre for WTO Studies. 2016, Working Paper CWS/WP/200/27. P. 13-15. 
2 Precisely as regards the human rights, in 2008 prof. John Ruggie, in the Report of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
has expressed, besides other things, his concerns about the status of transnational corporations as follows: “their 
legal rights have been expanded significantly over the past generation. This has encouraged investment and trade 
flows, but it has also created instances of imbalances between firms and States that may be detrimental to human 
rights.” [in para. 12.] 
3 CRAWFORD, James. Chapter 27: The Kyoto Protocol in Investor-State Arbitration: Reconciling Climate 
Change and Investment Protection Objectives. In: SEGGER, Marie-Claire, GEHRING, Markus W. and 
NEWCOMBE, Andrew. Sustainable development in world investment law. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law 
International, 2011. P. 686. 
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More precisely, as regards the investors’ protection under the notion of indirect 
expropriation, the current problem in international investment arbitration practice is to find the 
scope of a taking against which the law gives effective protection but on the other hand does 
not take too much from the regulatory flexibility of states.4 
Hence, the foregoing boils down to the fact that in the prospective investor-state disputes 
the investment tribunals will primarily have to deal not with the question whether the 
expropriation was lawful but whether there was any in the first place. Since, in the current 




4 SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy The International Law on Foreign Investment. 3rd ed. New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. P. 363. 




1. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To the date, 3285 international investment agreements have been concluded while on the 
basis of some of them a total of 983 disputes have been brought before the investment tribunals 
within the ambit of international investment law.6 
Although more than half of these disputes revolved around allegations of indirect 
expropriation, and one would assume that the matter has already been exhaustively resolved, 
the opposite is true.7 The concept of indirect expropriation is still far from a clearly understood 
institute while the approach thereto both in practice of the investment tribunals and IIAs leaves 
much to be desired. 
It is precisely the drafting of IIAs where the most problematic issues concerning the 
concept of indirect expropriation have their roots. The point is that there is a wide range of 
different wordings of expropriation clauses where the terminology related to the matter is being 
addressed with a great portion of creativity. These clauses do address individual forms of 
expropriation (i.e. direct, indirect, tantamount to, etc.), however, not all of them mention 
indirect expropriation. What is more, while these forms might be listed in the expropriation 
clauses of IIAs, there usually is a lack of guidelines that would indicate how to treat the concept 
of these different types of expropriation (especially indirect expropriation) in case the dispute 
arises between a state and an investor. To put the record straight, over the last few decades the 
practice of drafting IIAs has indeed gone through several important changes. However, as it 
goes for the method of trial and error, the changes and re-wordings mostly concerned those IIAs 
under which the investment claims were brought before international tribunals.  
Another aggravating issue is also the very heterogeneous terminology, which mainly 
concerns indirect expropriation, especially its individual subcategories.8 One can also encounter 
formulations such as “tantamount to expropriation” or “equivalent to” expropriation, which in 
 
 
6 ANON., 2019. Home | UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. Investmentpolicy.unctad.org [online] [accessed. 3 . 
December 2019]. Retrieved z: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/ 
7 DOLZER, Rudolf. Indirect expropriations: new developments. New York University Environmental Law Journal. 
2002, 11(1), 64-93. P. 68. 
8 References are often being made to de facto, disguised, creeping or consequential, constructive, regulatory or 
virtual expropriation, and other forms basically referring to the same situation. 
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itself is a very vague concept and requires further specification which, for the time being, the 
tribunals failed to unanimously agree upon. 
Furthermore, the above mentioned has directly contributed to the inconsistency in the 
decisions of the investment tribunals. It is true, as will also be shown further, that many tribunals 
agreed on plentiful aspects of indirect expropriation and other concepts discussed in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that miscellaneous questions have yet to be resolved (and preferably 
as soon as possible). 
Finally, in the process of the development of indirect expropriation the states’ inherent 
power to regulate started to be oppressed by the protection of foreign investors. In fact, “failure 
of some arbitral tribunals to […] allow States a sufficient margin to determine and implement 
various policy goals, has contributed to the legitimacy crisis in which the investment treaty 
system currently finds itself.”9 
As a consequence, the states have with an increasing tendency begun to include into IIAs 
specific arrangements to reaffirm and secure their regulatory powers. This not only gave rise to 
inclusion of very detailed interpretation annexes to the “expropriation clauses”, but also 
triggered the practice of incorporation the so-called “general exceptions clauses” into IIAs 
which are the ultimate tool supposed to protect the state’s regulatory flexibility. 
In view of the above, this thesis will ruminate on the foregoing and answer the following 
questions. 
(i) Which method shall be applied by international investment tribunals in the 
scrutiny of the challenged state’s measures in cases of indirect expropriation? 
(ii) What are the possible means the states can utilize in pursuance of recalibration 
of the relationship between their regulatory flexibility and investors’ 
protection? 
(iii) Do the GECs have any practical applicability within the ambit of international 
investment law? 
Before diving into the discussion over the outlined questions, it bears emphasizing that the 
concept of indirect expropriation and its relationship with the state’s right to regulate is a very 
complex and complicated topic. Hence, for the purpose of this thesis only several aspects 
thereof will be addressed as otherwise this paper would turn into a never-ending story. The aim 
 
 
9 SHIRLOW, Esmé. Deference and Indirect Expropriation Analysis in International Investment Law: Observations 
on Current Approaches and Frameworks for Future Analysis. ICSID Review. 2014, 29 (3), pp. 595–626. P. 595. 
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is thus to provide a reader with a “hitchhiker’s guide” through the concept of indirect 
expropriation in the context of the state’s police powers. 
2. SOURCES AND METHOD 
In pursuance of the answers to the foregoing research questions, the analysis of this thesis 
proceeds from both primary and secondary sources. Most of all, these are: 
(i) case law; 
(ii) IIAs and other international legal documents; and  
(iii) miscellaneous scholarly works. 
Since especially the last Part of the thesis relates to the phenomenon of the general 
exceptions clauses which is a considerably novel topic introduced to the area of international 
investment law though IIAs, this Part will mostly rely on the current treaty practice and thus 
draw mostly upon the case law and IIAs. 
As concerns the methodology, there are several methods applied correspondingly with the 
research questions outlined above as well as the structure of the thesis. Firstly, the method of 
conceptual analysis is applied in the Parts which are dedicated to the analysis of the existing 
conceptual framework of the respective institutes subjected to the scrutiny therein.  
In the following, the method of analysis is applied to the individual cases while particular 
reasonings of the investment tribunals are subjected to the method of synthesis. Accordingly, 
IIAs are scrutinized under a method of analysis as well as the comparative method mostly 
applied to the study of the respective treaty wordings. 
Additionally, the method of analysis applied to the case law and IIAs is both the 
quantitative and qualitative; qualitative as regards the scrutiny of individual reasonings and 
wordings of IIAs, quantitative as concerns the analysed data on the types of cases decided, their 




3. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The structure of this thesis consists of six Parts: an introductory section, four substantive 
sections and a conclusion. 
An introductory section sets forth the main idea of the thesis and the research questions 
which are to be dealt with therethroughout. Additionally, it determines the sources used and 
methodology applied in order to provide with the answers to the established research questions.  
Followingly, the thesis proceeds with the substantive section. This consists of four closely 
thematically interrelated Parts; the first providing with the general underpinning theoretical 
background, the latter three successively dealing with each and individual phenomenon set forth 
in the beginning of the thesis.  
For the sake of greater clarity, each Part of the thesis is outlined in a similar manner: first 
is the descriptive section introducing the topic and providing with the discussion on principal 
issues related thereto, second and third revolving around the treaty practice and jurisprudence 
concerning the respective phenomenon. The latter emerges from the fact that each of the 
concepts discussed made its way into IIAs in a variety of forms which in turn, jointly with the 
different doctrinal and legal background of the respective investment tribunals, caused 
inconsistencies of opinion in the decision-making practice of the ISDS. 
Hence, the first (I) Part termed “Expropriation” generally introduces the main 
characteristics of expropriation within the ambit of international investment law, by which it 
sets forth the terminological and doctrinal background to better navigate the reader through the 
following Parts. 
The second (II) Part termed “Indirect Expropriation” revolves around the issues related to 
the assessment of the cases based on the allegations of indirect expropriation. It also touches 
upon the issues of balancing the protections of the investors’ proprietary rights and the states’ 
police powers which is then taken up by the third Part. The purpose of this Part is to generally 
delineate the issues related to the concept of indirect expropriation and to ruminate over the 
essential issues related to the matter which provide the subsequent Parts with certain 
terminological frames. 
The third (III) Part termed “Right to Regulate and Indirect Expropriation” follows with 
the thorough discussion regarding the state’s sovereign right to regulate its internal matter. It 
mostly focuses on the collision of the police powers and investors’ protection within the ambit 
of international investment law. 
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The fourth (IV) Part termed “General Exceptions” introduces one of the means of 
incorporating the aforementioned police powers into the wordings of IIAs. As for the fact that 
this practice is considerably new for the international investment law, this part also outlines 
several issues that have not been resolved yet but might later cause difficulties in application 
within the ISDS practice. 
Finally, the conclusion summarizes and integrates all the foregoing issues discussed in the 
thesis. Additionally, it aspires to provide certain guidelines for a complex solution based on the 
recalibration of the relationship of public and private rights within the ambit of international 





1. EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW  
In international law, the states as sovereigns have in principle right of taking of any 
property located at their territories including the possessions of foreign investors.10 This is also 
partly linked to the general entitlement of the states to regulate as sometimes adopting new laws 
can have an expropriatory effect on foreign investment. However, the possibility to lawfully 
take over the foreign property is not unlimited as states can only do so in a non-discriminatory 
way, for a public purpose, and on payment of prompt and adequate compensation11.12 
The aforesaid takings are jointly referred to as expropriation which, in the terms of 
international investment law, can be simply defined as taking by the host state of a foreign 
investor’s rights or properties.13 Unlike nationalization, which refers to large-scale takings of 




10 SCHREUER, Christoph. The Concept of Expropriation under the ETC and other Investment Protection Treaties. 
Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) [online]. 1 June 2005, 2.3. [Accessed 20 June 2019]. Available at 
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=467. P. 2, para. 1. 
11 The so-called Hull formula which is still the best-known definition of the compensation standard as well as the 
most extensive one in scope. The formula was introduced by the United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
who in 1938, upon the expropriation of United States property in Mexico, required “prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation”. 
See in KADIR, M. Ya’kub Aiyub. Hull Formula and Standard of Compensation for Expropriation in Postcolonial 
States. Kanun: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum [online]. 29 May 2017, 19(2), 231-248, p. 235 [Accessed 20 June 2019]. ISSN 
2527 – 8428. Available at http://www.jurnal.unsyiah.ac.id/kanun/article/view/7061/6825; MARBOE, Irmgard. 
Calculation of compensation and damages in international investment law. 2nd ed. Oxford : Oxford University 
Press, 2012. P. 20, paras 2.45-2.46. 
12 DUGAN, Christopher F., WALLACE, Don, RUBINS, Noah and ṢABĀḤĪ, Burzū. Investor-state arbitration. 
New York : Oxford University Press, 2011. P. 438. 
13 DERAINS, Yves and SICARD-MIRABAL, Josefa. Chapter 5: Expropriation. In: Introduction to Investor-State 
Arbitration. Alphen aan den Rijn : Wolters Kluwer, 2018, pp. 115 – 132. P. 117. 
14 Expropriation - A Sequel. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Series on Issues 
in International Investment Agreements II. UN instance [online]. 21 February 2013, p. 5 [Accessed 20 June 2019]. 




The takings may occur in the form of an open and deliberate seizure of a property with a 
simultaneous transfer of title to property to the host state itself or a state-owned third party.15 
However, some measures short of physical takings can also fall under the term “expropriation” 
if they permanently destroy the economic value of the investment or deprive the owner of its 
ability to manage, use or control his or her property in a meaningful way.16 
In practice, as was described for example in Santa Elena, the takings of the property can 
occur in different forms depriving the foreign investors of their proprietary rights to a different 
extent.17 As will be addressed further in detail, emerging from the previous development 
(especially concerning the measures short of physical takings), the boundaries of the scope of 
what exactly constitutes the act of taking have got blurred.18 Hence, it is currently impractical 
to draw a clear picture of what activities or measures precisely would constitute expropriation. 
1.1 Types of expropriation 
In reaction to the uncertainty in the practical point of view, certain groups or types of 
expropriation have crystalized in the theory and ISDS practice. 
Although some of the scholars and other professionals have already expressed certain 
scepticism regarding the need for such division of the concept of expropriation, it seems to be 
rather commonly accepted that there are different types of takings which require a diverse 
approach.19 Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that no matter what type of expropriation 
 
 
15 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Chapter 7 – Expropriation. In: Law and practice of investment 
treaties: Standards of treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kulwer Law International, 2009. P. 323. 
16 UNCTAD II, p. xi. 
17 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award, 
17 February 2000, para. 76; 
“As is well known, there is a wide spectrum of measures that a state may take in asserting control over property, 
extending from limited regulation of its use to a complete and formal deprivation of the owner’s legal title. 
Likewise, the period of time involved in the process may vary—from an immediate and comprehensive taking to 
one that only gradually and by small steps reaches a condition in which it can be said that the owner has truly lost 
all the attributes of ownership”. 
18 SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The International Law on Foreign Investment. 3rd ed. New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. P. 363. 
19 STERN, Brigitte. In Search Of The Frontiers Of Indirect Expropriation. In: ROVINE, Arthur, W. Contemporary 
Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers. Volume 1, 2007. [online]. Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, s. 29-52 [ Accessed 26 November 23019]. Available at: 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/books/10.1163/ej.9789004167384.i-336.23. P. 35. 
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occurs or is found, the rule of thumb is that due and timely compensation has to be paid to the 
aggrieved investor.20 
Generally, the three types of taking recognized within the treaty practice and theory are 
(i) direct, (ii) indirect, and (iii) „tantamount to“ or „equivalent to“ a taking.21 The tribunals, 
however, often only refer to direct and indirect expropriation classifying the last mentioned as 
an indirect expropriation.22 In fact, the idea of the third category of takings (apart from direct 
and indirect) was refused by the tribunal in S.D. Myers case.23 Following the argumentation in 
S.D. Myers, this thesis will also address only direct and indirect expropriation dealing with the 
measures tantamount to or equivalent to a taking under the discussion regarding indirect 
expropriation. 
1.2 Distinction between direct and indirect expropriation 
Cases of certain takings falling under the group of direct expropriation are usually deemed 
clear and imminent; the other measures, however, are less evident as they are achieved by 
depriving the investor of rights which results in the investor’s loss of control, use, enjoyment 
or value of their property.24 The letter refers to the cases of indirect expropriation. 
 
 
BEEN, Vicki and BEAUVAIS, Joel C. The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTAs Investment Protections and the 
Misguided Quest for an International Regulatory Takings Doctrine. SSRN Electronic Journal. 1 April 2002. Vol. 
78:30. P. 51 
20 MARBOE, Irmgard. Calculation of compensation and damages in international investment law. 2nd ed. Oxford : 
Oxford University Press, 2012. P.43, para. 3.05. 
21 RAJPUT, Aniruddha. Regulatory freedom and indirect expropriation in investment arbitration. Netherlands : 
Wolters Kluwer, 2019. P. 22.  
22 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 286, Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 
2003, para. 96. 
23 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 286; 
„The Tribunal agrees with the conclusion in the Interim Award of the Pope & Talbot Arbitral Tribunal that 
something that is “equivalent” to something else cannot logically encompass more. In common with the Pope & 
Talbot Tribunal, this Tribunal considers that the drafters of the NAFTA intended the word “tantamount” to 
embrace the concept of so-called “creeping expropriation”[usually classified as indirect expropriation], rather 
than to expand the internationally accepted scope of the term expropriation.“ 
24 DERAINS, Yves and SICARD-MIRABAL, Josefa. Chapter 5: Expropriation. In: Introduction to Investor-State 
Arbitration. Alphen aan den Rijn : Wolters Kluwer, 2018, pp. 115 – 132. P. 117. 
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Direct expropriation can be described as the outright physical seizure of a foreign 
investor’s property, or title to such property, by the host state25 accompanied by a transfer of an 
essential part of property rights to a different beneficiary.26 Furthermore, the host state’s intent 
to expropriate is also requisite.27 For instance, according to UNCTAD in cases of direct 
expropriation,  
“there is an open, deliberate and unequivocal intent, as reflected in a formal law or 
decree or physical act, to deprive the owner of his or her property through the transfer 
of title or outright seizure”.28 
In practice, for illustration, in Funnekotter case the tribunal held that Zimbabwe 
expropriated the claimants’ investment by means of a government land acquisition programme 
and actual physical invasions.29  
Cases of direct expropriation also appeared in two considerably recent disputes. Firstly, 
in Stati, a case concerning the oil and gas industry, the tribunal found that certain activities of 
the Kazakh government led to the direct seizure of claimants’ rights under the Subsoil Use 
Contracts.30 Secondly, in Flughafen Zürich, the tribunal held Venezuela responsible for direct 
 
 
25 BLACKABY, Nigel, PARTASIDES, Constantine, REDFERN, Alan and HUNTER, Martin. Redfern and 
Hunter on international arbitration. 6th ed. Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2015. P. 471. 
26 Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 28 September 
2007, para. 280.  
“The Tribunal does not in fact believe that there can be a direct form of expropriation if at least some essential 
component of the property right has not been transferred to a different beneficiary, in particular the State”. 
27 Ibid., para. 282; 
“It is at this point that the intention to expropriate becomes relevant, and the parties have discussed this matter 
with clear attention. The Tribunal is persuaded that while many damages can be inflicted unintentionally, and as 
such will be entitled to compensation if liability is found to exist, a transfer of property and ownership requires 
positive intent”. 
28 UNCTAD II, p 7. 
29 BLACKABY, Nigel, PARTASIDES, Constantine, REDFERN, Alan and HUNTER, Martin. Redfern and 
Hunter on international arbitration. 6th ed. Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2015. P. 471. 
30 Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. 
V 116/2010, Award, 19 December 2013, para. 1129 ; 
“Indeed, such an outright seizure of physical assets, contractual rights, and legal title are textbook examples of 
“direct” expropriation. Hence, it is indisputable that Kazakhstan directly expropriated Claimants’ investments 
under Art. 13 ECT and international law in July 2010.”. 
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expropriation of the General Santiago Mariño international airport which arose upon enactment 
of the Decree 806.31 
Whereas the cases of direct expropriation are rather straightforward, the same does not 
apply to the measures falling within indirect expropriation. The main issue is that indirect 
expropriation usually neither involves an outright seizure and a transfer of title to the property, 
nor it evinces clear signs of the state’s intent to expropriate.32  
The cases of an outright seizure of investors’ property were, in the first place, the core 
reason for the protection against expropriatory measures of the host states in international 
investment law.33 Direct expropriation, however, has now mostly faded and has been replaced 
by indirect expropriation and seemingly non-expropriatory activities of states.34 Indeed, 
currently, the vast majority of the disputes between states and foreign investors revolves around 
the measures that do not exactly amount to a direct taking of an investor’s property but is 
detrimental to the existence of his or her investment.35 
1.3 Expropriation in IIAs 
Following the aforementioned, states indeed have certain right to take over the property 
at their territory, yet this right inevitably meets its limits at the second end of this spectrum in a 
form of investors’ right to property. 
The protection of foreign investors from expropriatory measures that do not fulfil legal 
requirements “traditionally has been one of the main guarantees found in IIAs”.36 In order to 
assure investors that their property will not be arbitrarily seized by the host state’s government, 
 
 
31 Flughafen Zürich A.G. and Gestión e Ingenería IDC S.A. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/19, Award, 18 
November 2014, paras. 494–509. 
32 For further discussion on the issues related to indirect expropriation, see the Part “Indirect Expropriation”. 
33 BROWN, Chester. Commentaries on selected model investment treaties. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
2013. P. 5. 
34 ALBERTO, Enrique. The Concept of “Indirect Expropriation”, its appearance in the international system and 
its effects in the regulatory activity of governments. Civilizar Ciencias Sociales y Humanas [online]. 2011, vol. 
11, n. 21, pp. 77-98 [Accessed 20 June 2019]. Available at 
http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1657-89532011000200006&lng=en&nrm=iso. 
35 UNCTAD II, p.15; Advanced Search | Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator | UNCTAD Investment Policy 
Hub [online]. [Accessed 20 June 2019]. Available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-
settlement/advanced-search. 
36 UNCTAD II, p. xi. 
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states generally include provisions regulating expropriation in their bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties, i.e. IIAs.37 Some states, such as Peru or Ecuador, even included provisions 
in their constitutions preventing them from adopting changes to the contracts with foreign 
investors unilaterally.38 
The development of international protection of foreign investors led the treaty practice 
regarding expropriation to establish four general requirements for the taking of property to be 
lawful.39 Those requirements are (i) a legitimate public purpose; (ii) a non-discriminatory 
manner of measures in question; (iii) carried out in compliance with the due process; and (iv) 
for payment of compensation.  
Despite the lack of uniformity regarding the wording of provisions regulating 
expropriation and the differences among miscellaneous IIAs concerning the use of terms, those 
four requirements remain at the core of a general rule under which expropriatory measures are 
deemed lawful and thus allowed.40 
 
 
37 DERAINS, Yves and SICARD-MIRABAL, Josefa. Chapter 5: Expropriation. In: Introduction to Investor-State 
Arbitration. Alphen aan den Rijn : Wolters Kluwer, 2018, pp. 115 – 132. P. 117. 
38 ŠTURMA, Pavel and Vladimír BALAŠ. Mezinárodní ekonomické právo. 2nd ed. Prague : C.H. Beck, 2013. 
Beckova edice právo. ISBN 978-80-7179-069-3. P. 403. 
39 See, for example, NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties 
standards of treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 369. 
40 For the sake of illustration of similarities in IIAs practice regarding the wording of expropriation clauses, see, 
for example: 
Germany-Pakistan BIT (1959)  
“Art 3 (2) Nationals or companies of either Party shall not be subjected to expropriation of their investments in 
the territory of the other Party except for public benefit against compensation, which shall represent the 
equivalent of the investments affected. Such compensation shall be actually realizable and freely transferable in 
the currency of the other Party without undue delay. Adequate provision shall be made at or prior to the time of 
expropriation for the determination and the grant of such compensation. The legality of any such expropriation 
and the amount of compensation shall be subject to review by due process of law.”; 
Australia-Indonesia CEPA (2019) “Article 14.11: Expropriation and Compensation (1.) A Party shall not 
expropriate or nationalise a covered investment either directly or through measures equivalent to expropriation 
or nationalisation (expropriation), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and (d) in accordance with due process of law.”; 
EU-Singapore FTA (2018) 
“Article 2.6 (1) of Neither Party shall directly or indirectly nationalise, expropriate or subject to measures having 
effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) the covered 
investments of covered investors of the other Party except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in accordance with due 




Further arrangements included in the “expropriation” clauses are typical for more recent 
IIAs. Generally, the more recent IIA is, the more complex structure and wording of the 
“expropriation” clause (including the respective annexes and protocols) it has. 
Thus, especially IIAs concluded in the past two decades usually also address a method of 
determining the compensation. Frequently, such IIAs require that the compensation amount “to 
the fair market value of the covered investment” or “the real value of the expropriated 
investment immediately before the expropriation” including “interest at a reasonable rate 
established on a commercial basis, from the date of expropriation until the date of payment”.41 
Moreover, such compensation shall be “effectively realisable, freely transferable […] and made 
without delay”. 42 Which is simply a more detailed specification of a general requirement for 
compensation to be prompt, adequate, and effective in accordance with the so-called Hull 
formula mentioned before.43  
Additionally, the recent IIAs also frequently incorporate the right of an investor affected 
by expropriatory measures to “have a prompt review of its claim and of the valuation of its 
investment, by a judicial or other independent authority of that Party”.44 
 
 
41 See, for example, EU – Viet Nam Investment Protection Agreement (2019), Article 2.7; Australia – Hong Kong 
Investment Agreement (2019), Article 10; Nicaragua – Russian Federation BIT (2012), Article 4; Australia – Lao 
People's Democratic Republic BIT (1994), Article 7. 
42 Ibid. 
43 For the Hull formula see MARBOE, Irmgard. Calculation of compensation and damages in international 
investment law. 2nd ed. Oxf ord : Oxford University Press, 2012. P.20, paras 2.45-2.46. 
44 See, for example, EU – Viet Nam Investment Protection Agreement (2019), Article 2.7; Finland - Guatemala 




Upon a brief characterization of the most important aspects of expropriation in 
international investment law, it is now time to fully delve into the core of the research questions 
set at the beginning of this thesis. 
In a nutshell, as was indicated before indirect expropriation usually takes place when the 
host state adopts measures the effect of which is so detrimental that the foreign investor cannot 
enjoy, use or otherwise profit from his or her investment anymore.45 The term “measure” here 
encompasses essentially any action in the form of a regulation, legislation, administrative action 
or judicial decision undertaken by a host state through its legislative, executive or judicial 
branches.46  
Strictly speaking, in cases where an investment tribunal finds a measure to be 
expropriatory the state is then obliged to compensate the investor in question for losses it had 
suffered.47 The rule is the same as in cases of direct seizure of property. 
The problem, however, stays with how to identify an expropriatory measure in the first 
place. As the case may be, the measures adopted are not always that detrimental for the 
investment or they might be adopted through a long period of time amounting to expropriation 
only in an aggregate. Moreover, sometimes the measures are simply necessary to adopt in order 
to preserve the public health, environment or any other society-wide objective; in which case it 
would seem against the common sense to “penalize” the host state. 
Hence, given the abundance of issues related to the matter, not only is the doctrine fairly 
nonuniform, but also the jurisprudence concerning indirect expropriation is inconsistent, and 




45 BISHOP, R. Doak, James CRAWFORD and W. Michael REISMAN. Foreign investment disputes: cases, 
materials, and commentary. 2nd ed. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2014. P. 745. 
46 RAJPUT, Aniruddha. Regulatory freedom and indirect expropriation in investment arbitration. Netherlands : 
Wolters Kluwer, 2019. P. 8. 
47 MARBOE, Irmgard. Calculation of compensation and damages in international investment law. 2nd ed. Oxford : 
Oxford University Press, 2012. P.20, paras 3.05 et seq. 
48 DOLZER, Rudolf. Indirect expropriations: new developments. New York University Environmental Law 
Journal. 2002, 11(1), 64-93. P. 68. 
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1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
The need to protect foreign investors against potentially arbitrary conduct of the host-state, 
has been recognized for a long time in international public law.49 Consequently, examining the 
state’s measures aggravating investor’s activity led to the establishment of a concept of indirect 
expropriation. It is reflected in many scholarly works, modern treaty practice and especially it 
has been a subject to different claims brought before international investment tribunals.50  
Prior to the complex provisions formed within the practice of IIAs, several international 
legal instruments have mentioned indirect expropriation and attempted codify the attributes of 
measures amounting thereto.51 
One of the earliest references can be found in the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention 
which stated that “[n]o Party shall [deprive a national] directly or indirectly of their property 
[…].”52 
Similarly, the 1961 Harvard Draft Convention contained that  
“[a] “taking of property” includes not only an outright taking of property but also any 
such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property as to 
justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the 
property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference.” 
and  
“[…] any unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of property for a limited 
period of time.”53 
 
 
49 BURGHETTO, María, Beatriz and LORFING, Pascale, Accaoui, The Evolution and Current Status of the 
Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Investment Arbitration and Investment Treaties. Indian Journal of Arbitration 
Law. 2017, VI (2), pp. 98 -123. P.100; See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), 
Decision, 26 June 1978, p. 99. 
50 SCHREUER, Christoph. The Concept of Expropriation under the ETC and other Investment Protection Treaties. 
Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) [online]. 1 June 2005, 2.3. [Accessed 20 June 2019]. Available at 
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=467. P. 1, para. 1. 
51 DOLZER, Rudolf and BLOCH, Felix. Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments? International Law 
FORUM du droit international. 2003, 5(3), pp. 155–165. P. 156. 
52 “The Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention)”, In: Herman ABS, and 
SHAWCROSS, Hartley. Draft Convention on Investments Abroad. In: The proposed convention to protect private 
foreign investment: a round table. Journal of Public Law (presently Emory Law Journal), 1960, 1, pp. 115-118. 
Article III. 
53 “Harvard draft convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens”, In: SOHN, Louis 
B. and BAXTER, R. R. Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens: II. Draft 
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The 1980 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States also 
stated that it applied “to not only avowed expropriation in which the government formally 
takes title to property, but also to other actions of the government that have the effect of 
“taking” the property, […]”.54 
The 1967 OECD Draft Convention also recognized indirect expropriation by establishing 
that “no Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, [a national] of his 
property […]”.55 Additionally, according to the commentary thereof, measures amounting to 
indirect expropriation would be those that:  
“[aimed] to deprive ultimately the alien of the enjoyment or value of his property, 
without any specific act being identifiable as outright deprivation. As instances may be 
quoted excessive or arbitrary taxation; […] refusal of access to raw materials or of 
essential export or import licences.”56 
The three latter mentioned, were frequently referred to by the investment tribunals when 
assessing cases of indirect expropriation becoming a stable referential legal body even though 
the OECD Draft Convention and the Harvard Draft Convention were never adopted.57 
Finally, the OECD’s multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) provided that “a 
Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or indirectly an investment in 
its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or take any measure or measures 
having equivalent effect.” 58 
 
 
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens. The American Journal of 
International Law. 1961, 55(3), 548. Article 10(3), a) and b). 
54 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 712, comment g. In: ANON. 
Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The American Law Institute. Case 
Citations, Rules and Principles, Part VII, Chapter II - Injury to Nationals of Other States, Restat 3d of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the U.S., § 712. 
55 “OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. Article 3”. In: ANON. OECD Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. The International Lawyer. 1968, 2(2), pp. 331-353. American 
Bar Association. Pp. 337-338. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40704497 
56 Ibid. 
57 See, for example, Saluka, Pope &Talbot or Inicia.  
58 The objective of this treaty was to provide a broad multilateral framework for international investment with high 
standards for the liberalisation and investment protection. Negotiations were, however, discontinued in 1998.  




Likewise, following the treaty and arbitration practice, also UNCTAD provided with the 
characterization of measures falling under indirect expropriation by assembling certain 
cumulative elements. Those elements are (a) attributability of the measure adopted to the host 
state; (b) interference of the measure with the property rights or other protected legal interests; 
(c) impact of measures imposed is of such degree that the relevant rights or interests lose all or 
most of their value or the owner is deprived of control over the investment; (d) despite the fact 
that the owner retains the legal title or remains in physical possession.59 
Notwithstanding these attempts of codification and description of indirect expropriation 
concept, there is still no clear definition thereof and is yet to be established.60 
1.1 Forms of indirect expropriation 
On the grounds of disunity and ambiguities in terminology one can also encounter 
references to de facto, disguised, creeping 61 or consequential62, constructive, regulatory63 or 
 
 
59 UNCTAD II,, p. 12. 
60 Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, IIC 205 (2001), Final Award, 3 September 2001, para. 200; Saluka 
Investments B.V. v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para. 263. 
61 See, for example, BISHOP, R. Doak, James CRAWFORD and W. Michael REISMAN. Foreign investment 
disputes: cases, materials, and commentary. 2nd ed. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2014. 
P. 745; RAJPUT, Aniruddha. Regulatory freedom and indirect expropriation in investment arbitration. 
Netherlands : Wolters Kluwer, 2019. P. 57; PAPARINSKIS, Martins. Chapter 13: Regulatory Expropriation and 
Sustainable Development. In: SEGGER, Marie-Claire, GEHRING, Markus W. and NEWCOMBE, Andrew. 
Sustainable development in world investment law. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2011, pp. 299 
– 327. Pp. 305-306; And, for example, cases Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, Award, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 24 July 2008, para. 408, 415; LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp and others 
v The Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 3 October 2006, para. 188-194; 
Generation Ukraine Inc v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003, paragraph 20.29, 
para. 20.22. 
62 See, for example, BISHOP, Doak R., CRAWFORD, J. R. and REISMAN, Michael. Foreign investment 
disputes: Cases materials and commentary. 2nd ed. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2014. P. 
1075; REISMAN, W. Michael and SLOANE, Robert D. Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the Bit 
Generation. British year book of international law. 2004, 74(1), 115-150. Pp. 128-133; NEWCOMBE, Andrew 
and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : 
Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 395. 
63 See, for example, PAULSSON, Jan. Indirect Expropriation: Is the Right to Regulate at risk? Transnational 
Dispute Management (TDM) [online]. 1 April 2006. [Accessed 2 December 2019]. Available at: 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=776; NEWCOMBE, Andrew and 
PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer 
Law International, 2009. Pp. 341 et seq. 
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virtual expropriation.64 Nevertheless, the aforesaid denominations are deemed to fall under the 
scope of indirect expropriation as its subcategories.65  
Miscellaneous forms of indirect expropriation were referred to in scholarly works and 
international investment arbitration practice. Usually, the tribunals tried to distinguish 
individual those forms by assessing the time frame and the number of acts and measures 
adopted by the host state or by examination of the state’s regulatory framework. 
Some of the types of indirect expropriation acquired intensified attention of scholars and 
international investment tribunals which tried to describe the essential attributes thereof. Thus, 
this thesis will further elaborate on the three mostly discussed categories – creeping (or 
consequential), disguised expropriation and measures tantamount to or equivalent to 
expropriation.  
1.1.1 Creeping and consequential expropriation 
The distinctive feature of these types of indirect expropriation is that both in the end lead 
to deprivation of investor’s property but do so gradually. Hence, some of such activities of the 
host states could be left unnoticed and the investors would not be granted any protection. 
Both creeping and consequential expropriations involve the chain of events that rarely 
reveals any dramatic moment which would demarcate the act of expropriation.66 Therefore, the 
assessment of those forms of indirect expropriation is accompanied by several difficulties.  
Firstly, as was concluded in Generation Ukraine, “[a]lthough international precedents on 
indirect expropriation are plentiful, it is difficult to find many cases that fall squarely into 
the more specific paradigm of creeping expropriation.”67 
Thus, there is not sufficient number of decisions that would provide with clear guidelines 
on how to assess the potential cases of creeping or consequential expropriation.  
 
 
64 UNCTAD II, p. 26; NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties 
standards of treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 326. 
65 SUBEDI, P. Surya. International investment law: reconciling policy and principle. Oxford : Hart Publishing 
Ltd., 2016. P. 76-77. MCLACHLAN, Campbell, SHORE, Laurence and WEINIGER, Matthew. International 
investment arbitration substantive principles. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017. P. 383, para. 8.75. 
66 REISMAN, W. Michael; SLOANE, Robert D. Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the Bit Generation. 
British year book of international law. 2004, 74(1), 115-150. P.142. 
67 Generation Ukraine Inc v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003, para. 20.22. 
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Secondly, under creeping or consequential expropriation the measures or acts of the state 
are deemed to be wrongful and amounting to expropriation only in aggregate. Thus, in case that 
the chain of events is scattered in sufficient amount of time, it sure will be very difficult to 
evaluate the picture as a whole. Not mentioning the difficulties with the evaluation of the 
prospective compensation. 
As was mentioned by Reisman & Sloane “a creeping expropriation is comprised of a 
number of elements, none of which can – separately – constitute the international wrong.”68 
According to prof. George C. Christie, those types of indirect expropriation  
“often mature into explicit takeovers as events take their course, and in the absence of 
legal machinery capable of reacting swiftly and efficiently to these situations when they 
arise, claims relating to them tend to become mooted or, in any event, less demanding of 
legal attention.”69 
Two prominent cases attempted to bring certain specification of creeping expropriation. 
Firstly, the tribunal in Generation Ukraine concluded that creeping expropriation “is a 
form of indirect expropriation with a distinctive temporal quality […] whereby a series of acts 
attributable to the State over a period of time culminate in the expropriatory taking of such 
property.”70 
Similarly, the tribunal in Telenor observed that expropriation does not necessarily have to 
be caused by a single act but “there may be “creeping” expropriation involving a series of acts 
over a period of time none of which is itself of sufficient gravity to constitute an expropriatory 
act but all of which taken together produce the effects of expropriation.”71 
 
 
68 REISMAN, W. Michael; SLOANE, Robert D. Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the Bit Generation. 
British year book of international law. 2004, 74(1), 115-150. P. 123. [In the original quoting the dissenting opinion 
of Keith Highet in Waste Management v. Mexico, Award of 2 June 2000 (Exh. CL-177)] 
69 WESTON, Burns H., “Constructive Takings” Under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of 
“Creeping Expropriation”. Virginia Journal of International Law. 1975, 16(1), 103-176. ISSN: 0042-6571. P. 107; 
See also CHRISTIE, G.C. What constitutes a taking of property under international law? British Yearbook of 
International Law. 1962, 38, 307–338. P. 310. 
70 Generation Ukraine Inc v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003, para. 20.22. 
71 Telenor Mobile Communications AS v The Republic of Hungary, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, 22 June 
2006, para. 63. 
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The tribunal in Burlington also emphasized that a “creeping approach” should be 
“employed only when no single measure is in itself expropriatory.”72 
Lastly, as for a consequential expropriation, according to Reisman and Sloane it involves 
a “state’s interference with or failure to create or maintain the normative legal, administrative, 
and regulatory framework contemplated by a BIT, as a consequence of which managerial 
control, profitability, and ultimately viability, erode”.73  
1.1.2 Disguised expropriation 
The specific feature of disguised expropriation is that it results in a total taking of 
investor’s property which makes it quite shifted towards direct expropriation. The only 
difference is that in order to expropriate the host state does not use any formal means which its 
law prescribes.74  
For instance, disguised expropriation was referred to in ELSI case. The United States there 
charged Italy for a requisition of ELSI, a company the main shareholder of which was a U.S. 
manufacturer of electronics and for the subsequent purchase of ELSI’s assets for a sum well 
below market value.75 The ICJ found that Italy’s conduct amounted to expropriation and 
concluded that “[the measures] alleged by the Applicant, if not an overt expropriation, might 
be regarded as a disguised expropriation; because, at the end of the process, it is indeed title 
to property itself that is at stake.” 76 
 
 
72 Burlington Resources, Inc v Republic of Ecuador, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, 14 
December 2012, para 345. 
73 REISMAN, W. Michael; SLOANE, Robert D. Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the Bit Generation. 
British year book of international law. 2004, 74(1), 115-150. P.142. 
74 PAPARINSKIS, Martins. Chapter 13: Regulatory Expropriation and Sustainable Development. In: SEGGER, 
Marie-Claire, GEHRING, Markus W. and NEWCOMBE, Andrew. Sustainable development in world investment 
law. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2011, pp. 299 – 327. Pp. 305-306. 
75 Latest developments | Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy) | International Court 
of Justice [online]. [Accessed 20 November 2019]. Available from: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/76. 
76 Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI), United States v Italy, ICJ GL No 76, CJ Rep 15, (1989) 28 ILM 1109, ICGJ 95 
(ICJ 1989), Judgment, Merits, 20th July 1989, United Nations ; International Court of Justice. P. 11. 
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Simply stating, the disguised expropriation takes place when the title or most powers 
associated with ownership are transferred.77 
1.1.3 Measures “tantamount to” or “equivalent to” expropriation 
Lastly, the wording “tantamount to” or “equivalent to” expropriation is very commonly 
used in treaty practice and thus has been addressed by several tribunals in international 
investment arbitration. 
Nevertheless, the tribunals refused to put this wording on a par with the direct and indirect 
expropriation as the third type of expropriation in general. Otherwise, it would lead to an 
inadmissible extension of the term expropriation as such.78 
In Pope & Talbot the tribunal expressly refused to  
“believe that the phrase “measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation” in 
Article 1110 [NAFTA] broadens the ordinary concept of expropriation under 
international law to require compensation for measures affecting property interests 
without regard to the magnitude or severity of that effect.”79  
Similarly, the tribunal in Telenor held that “phrases such as “equivalent to expropriation” 
and “tantamount to expropriation” do not expand the concept of expropriation and are 
usually taken to indicate that the BIT covers indirect as well as direct expropriation, […] the 
same is true of “measures having a similar effect”[…].”80 
 
 
77 PAPARINSKIS, Martins. Chapter 13: Regulatory Expropriation and Sustainable Development. In: SEGGER, 
Marie-Claire, GEHRING, Markus W. and NEWCOMBE, Andrew. Sustainable development in world investment 
law. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2011, pp. 299 – 327. Pp. 305-306. 
78 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 285; MARTÍNEZ-FRAGA, 
Pedro J. and REETZ, C. Ryan. Public purpose in international law: rethinking regulatory sovereignty in the global 
era. Cambridge : Cambridge university press, 2017. P. 108. 
79 Pope & Talbot v Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, 26 June 2000, para 97. 
80 Telenor Mobile Communications AS v The Republic of Hungary, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, 22 June 
2006, para. 63. 
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1.2 Features of indirect expropriation 
Picking up the threads of what was briefly indicated before, contrary to the cases of direct 
expropriation, establishing indirect expropriation is accompanied by several perplexing issues. 
Firstly, in cases of indirect expropriation there is no transfer of title to property even 
though the foreign investment in question is practically rendered useless due to the host state’s 
activity.81 Actually, one of the core characteristics of indirect expropriation resides in the fact 
that there is “no change effected to the rights of possessions of the physical property of foreign 
investors”.82  
According to Redfern & Hunter indirect expropriation is caused by a measure that “does 
not involve an overt taking, but that effectively neutralizes the enjoyment of the property”.83 
Similarly, Sicard-Mirabal & Derains described indirect expropriation as a situation when the 
investor keeps its property, but the value of the investment is severely affected by measures 
adopted by the state.84  
Dr. Kunoy,85 prof. Newcombe and Dr. Paradell86 also unanimously concluded that it is 
not necessary for indirect expropriation that the formal transfer of title occurs, however, only 
under the condition that the state’s measure causes a substantial deprivation to investor’s 
property rights. The tribunals in Santa Elena and CME came to the same conclusion.87 
 
 
81 See, for example, UNCTAD II, p. 7; NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of 
investment treaties standards of treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 323; 
SCHREUER, Christoph. The Concept of Expropriation under the ETC and other Investment Protection Treaties. 
Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) [online]. 1 June 2005, 2.3. [Accessed 20 June 2019]. Available at 
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=467. P. 1. 
82 SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The International Law on Foreign Investment. 3rd ed. New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. P. 367. 
83 BLACKABY, Nigel, PARTASIDES, Constantine, REDFERN, Alan and HUNTER, Martin. Redfern and 
Hunter on international arbitration. 6th ed. Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2015. P.471. 
84 DERAINS, Yves and SICARD-MIRABAL, Josefa. Chapter 5: Expropriation. In: Introduction to Investor-State 
Arbitration. Alphen aan den Rijn : Wolters Kluwer, 2018, pp. 115 – 132. P. 115. 
85 KUNOY, Bjørn. Developments in Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID Transnational Arbitration. The 
Journal of World Investment & Trade. 2005, 6(3), 467–491. P.472. 
86 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of treatment. 
Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 369. 
87 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award, 
17 February 2000, para. 76; 
17 
 
Secondly, cases of indirect taking usually do not evince any visible sign of the state’s 
intent to expropriate which makes it even more difficult to identify.88  
According to prof Schreuer it is a generally accepted assumption that the bad faith (or the 
host state’s intent to expropriate) is not requisite for the purpose of establishing indirect 
expropriation.89 Furthermore, as prof Christie concluded in his article on takings of property;   
“[S]tate’ s mere declaration that expropriation is not intended is not determinative of the 
issue. Even when these protestations are made in good faith the cases have shown that 
expropriation can be an unintended result of a State's action”.90  
There were also several cases where tribunals specifically established that the intent to 
expropriate is not crucial in order to find the state’s measures expropriatory.91 On the other 
 
 
“[…] measure or series of measures can still eventually amount to a taking, though the individual steps in the 
process do not formally purport to amount to a taking or to a transfer of title”. 
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 September 2001, para. 150; 
“Such expropriations may be deemed to have occurred regardless of whether the State “takes” or transfers legal 
title to the investment”. 
88 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and 
practice of investment treaties standards of treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 
342; CHRISTIE, G.C. What constitutes a taking of property under international law? British Yearbook of 
International Law. 1962, 38, 307–338. P. 310: “There are several well-known international cases in which it has 
been recognized that property rights may be so interfered with that it may be said that to all intents and purposes 
those property rights have been expropriated even though the State in question has not purported to 
expropriate.”. 
89 SCHREUER, Christoph. The Concept of Expropriation under the ETC and other Investment Protection Treaties. 
Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) [online]. 1 June 2005, 2.3. [Accessed 20 June 2019]. Available at 
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=467. P. 36, para. 108. 
90 CHRISTIE, G.C. What constitutes a taking of property under international law? British Yearbook of 
International Law. 1962, 38, 307–338. P. 337. 
91 See, for example, Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, 2 August 2010, para. 
242: 
“For a measure to constitute expropriation under Article 1110 of NAFT A, it is common ground that (i) bad faith 
on the part of the Respondent is not required”; 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A., Vivendi Universal v Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 
Award, 20 August 2007, para. 5.3.24: 
“[…]it is well established that the government's intent to expropriate, or lack thereof, is not a principal concern.”; 
Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, IIC 205 (2001), Final Award, 3 September 2001, para. 197; 
“The intent of the State to deprive the investor of property is not a necessary element of expropriation.”. 
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hand, for instance the tribunal in Sea-Land Service required that there was a “deliberate 
governmental interference” on the part of the host state as well as an “intentional course of 
conduct directed against Sea-Land”.92 
Additionally, it was found that in cases where the intent to expropriate can be undoubtedly 
proven, that shall be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance to the 
disadvantage of the host state.93 Due to the differences in IIA’s wordings, though, several 
tribunals dismissed the concept of the intent to expropriate on the basis of the lack of foundation 
therefor in the respective IIA.94 
The fact that there is an evident sign of the state’s benefit from the expropriatory measures 
was not found to be imperative either. Indeed, the measures amounting to indirect expropriation 
do not have the same effect as in the cases of direct takings where the seizure of property 
imposed on a private person corresponds with the acquisition of certain avail by the public 
person.95 For instance, in Metalclad and CME the tribunals held that in the cases of indirect 




92 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Iran, 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., Award, 22 June 1984, para. 50. 
“A finding of expropriation would require, at the very least, that the Tribunal be satisfied that there was deliberate 
governmental interference with the conduct of Sea-Land’s operation, the effect of which was to deprive Sea-
Land of the use and benefit of its investment.” 
93 Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. 
V 116/2010, Award, 19 December 2013, para. 1468; 
“Professors Reisman and Sloane would agree: where the intent to expropriate can be proven, the State's intent to 
expropriate should be given significant weight in the assessment of the proper valuation date.” 
94 Siemens A.G. v The Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 17 January 2007, para. 270; 
“Argentina has argued against taking into consideration only the effect of measures for purposes of determining 
whether an expropriation has taken place. The Tribunal recalls that Article 4(2) refers to measures that “a sus 
efectos” (in its Spanish original) would be equivalent to expropriation or nationalization. The Treaty refers to 
measures that have the effect of an expropriation; it does not refer to the intent of the State to expropriate.”. 
95 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of treatment. 
Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 324. 
96 Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AB)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000, 
para. 103. 
“Thus, expropriation under NAFTA includes […] also covert or incidental interference with the use of property 
which has the effect of depriving the owner […] of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.”; 
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Thirdly, there is no exhaustive list of actionable measures that constitute indirect 
expropriation; hence, it is always on the tribunals’ deliberation whether indirect expropriation 
occurred. That would not cause a problem per se, however, what highly complicates the 
situation is the lack of a uniform test providing the tribunals with clear limits to their 
deliberation leading to fairly inconsistent approach to the issue of indirect expropriation.  
As a result of the foregoing, the line between indirect expropriation and non-expropriatory 
regulations which are deemed to not trigger the obligation to compensate is very blurred, or 
rather, almost non-existent.97 This can be illustrated for example by the two frequently criticized 
decisions of the cases Lauder98 and CME99. Despite having virtually identical100 factual 
background the tribunals reached opposite conclusions concerning the Czech Republic’s 
liability for deprivation of the Claimant. Thus, while the tribunal in Lauder found that there was 
no case of expropriation the CME tribunal reached the opposite conclusion regarding the same 
measures.101 
Nevertheless, at least the requirement of one of the indirect takings’ features stands 
undisputed. The scholars and other professionals have commonly agreed that regardless any 
other aspects, the state’s measures need to have a certain degree of adverse impact on the 
investment in order to be deemed expropriatory.102 According to Reinisch, usually, a “minor 
 
 
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 September 2001, para. 150;  
“Such expropriations may be deemed to have occurred regardless […]. It is also immaterial whether the State 
itself (rather than local investors or other third parties) economically benefits from its actions”. 
97 WEINER, Allen. Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy of "Legitimate" Regulatory Purposes. 
International Law FORUM du droit international [online]. 2003, 5(3), pp. 166-175 [Accessed 20 June 2019]. 
Available at https://brill.com/view/journals/inla/5/3/article-p166_5.xml. P. 167. 
98 Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, IIC 205 (2001). 
99 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 September 2001. 
100 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 September 2001, para. 412. 
101 ANON., 2019. Iisd.org [online] [accessed. 3 . December 2019]. Available at 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/int_investment_law_and_sd_key_cases_2010.pdf. P. 33; 
ANON., 2019. CME v. Czech Republic, Lauder v. Czech Republic – Investment Treaty News. Iisd.org [online] 
[accessed. 3 . December 2019]. Retrieved z: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2018/10/18/cme-v-czech-republic-lauder-v-
czech-republic/. 
102 See, for example, REINISCH, August. Expropriation. In: MUCHLINSKI, Peter, ORTINO, Federico, and 
SCHREUER, Christoph. The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law. 2008. Pp. 438-439; Indirect 
expropriations: new developments. New York University Environmental Law Journal. 2002, 11(1), 64-93. P. 79, 
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restriction [of] or interference with” the investor’s property would not amount to indirect 
expropriation.103 Generally, a “severe economic impact” or a “substantial loss of control or 
value” has to be found.104 
Hence, while establishing indirect expropriation the decisive aspect taken into 
consideration is precisely the gravity of the state’s interference with the investor’s property. As 
pointed out by Dolzer & Brunetti, it is generally acknowledged that “the severity of the impact 
upon the legal status and the factual impact on the ability of an investor to use and enjoy his 
property always constitutes a cardinal factor in determining whether or not an expropriation 
can be said to have occurred.”105  
The problem is, however, that there is little to no agreement on the exact criteria for the 
assessment of such an impact. Firstly, different amount of strictness is required by sundry 
scholars and arbitrators. Secondly, there is no agreement regarding whether the impact is on the 
economic values of the investment or the investors control thereover. Finally, there are also 
certain disagreements as to the duration of the impact or interference. All of which has been 
addressed within the ISDS practice. 
In the following, this thesis focuses on the most relevant decisions of international 
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2. INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION IN ISDS PRACTICE 
The issue of takings that are indirect has gradually become one of the most important 
developments in the decision-making process of international investment tribunals currently 
causing cardinal difficulties therein.106 
During the past few decades, the concept of indirect expropriation was being addressed 
by the tribunals rather extensively leaving us with an impressive body of approximately forty 
of what can be called “milestone” cases helping to shed some light on the matter.107  
Without mentioning the cases decided by the international courts and tribunals earlier in 
the 20th century, the previously mentioned can be very well illustrated by the survey provided 
by UNCTAD. Since 1994 so far 409 cases based on the alleged indirect expropriation have 
been brought before international tribunals.108 Compared to 120 cases based on allegations of 
direct expropriation109 it is safe to state that vast majority of investor-state disputes nowadays 
revolve around the measures that do not involve an overt taking but that effectively neutralize 
the benefit of the property of the foreign owner.110 Nevertheless, to stand such a claim is without 
any doubt rather difficult (out of the 409 cases only 122 cases were held to be founded, and 
thus decided in favour of investor).111 
References to indirect expropriation can be found even in some of the older cases. One of 
such cases is a 1926 PCJ case German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia.112 The conflict arose 
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between Germany and Poland on the grounds of “the taking over by [Polish Government] of 
control of the working of the nitrate factory at Chorzow; [and] taking possession of the movable 
property and patents, licences, etc., of the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Company”.113 The PCJ 
here concluded that the taking over of the factory by Poland also harmed patents, licences, 
experiments, etc. of Bayerische which in aggregate was held to amount to indirect 
expropriation. 
Moreover, an impressive amount of cases dealing with the matter of expropriation have 
been rendered by the Iran-US Tribunal.114 These cases have also been often relied upon by the 
investment tribunals when resolving disputes concerning indirect expropriation.115 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that such references to judicial practice of the Iran-
US tribunal in investment cases is problematic.116 Not only the tribunal’s procedural rules 
contain a very wide choice of law clause and the scope of the reviewable measures includes 
even “other measures affecting property rights” but these decisions are also often insufficiently 
reasoned.117 However, the interpretative and doctrinal clues given by the Iran- US tribunal in 
its decisions should not be ignored. 
Hence, to mention one of the frequently cited cases, in Starrett Housing118 the tribunal 
affirmed the conclusion that expropriation does not need to involve an overt taking of property. 
It encapsulated the concept of indirect takings in a well-known description stating that  
 
 
2.3. [Accessed 20 June 2019]. Available at https://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=467. P. 36, para. 108. 
113 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germ. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 25), Judgement, 
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114 RAJPUT, Aniruddha. Problems with the Jurisprudence of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal on Indirect 
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116 See, for example, Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada, NAFTA, Interim Award, 26 June 2000, 
para 104. 
117 RAJPUT, Aniruddha. Problems with the Jurisprudence of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal on Indirect 
Expropriation. ICSID Review. 2015, 30(3), pp. 589–615. Pp.590, 600, 607, 611. 
118 Similarly, the tribunal in 1983 case Tippetts referring to prof. Christie and Lena Goldfield's Case concluded 
that “[d]eprivation or taking of property may occur under international law through interference by a state in the 
use of that property or with the enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal title to the property is not affected.”  
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“measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that 
these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, 
even though […] the legal title to the property formally remains with the original 
owner119.” 
Likewise, in Cement Shipping indirect expropriation was described as: “measures […] the 
effect of which is to deprive the investor of the use and benefit of his investment even 
though he may retain nominal ownership of the respective rights”.120 
It follows that in order to depict the concept of indirect expropriation the tribunals 
generally used its essential attribute which is a host state’s adverse interference with the use 
and the enjoyment of the investor’s property. In addition, mostly the recent tribunals started to 
set a higher liability threshold in indirect expropriation claims adding more aspects to assess 
before rendering a decision.121  
Thus, the investment tribunals generally coincidently acknowledged that not only the 
direct interference with title to property, but also measures detrimental to the enjoyment of 
investment may constitute expropriation.122 Nonetheless, the acknowledgement of the existence 
of indirect expropriation is essentially almost the only point which the tribunals reached an 
agreement on concerning the matter. The scope of indirect expropriation and approach to the 
state’s measures falling therein is a whole another story. 
Many international tribunals have applied a variety of tests in order to assess allegedly 
expropriatory measures aggravating investor’s property; yet no unanimous approach thereto 
 
 
Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., Award, 28 October 1985, para. 219 et 
seq. 
119 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 16 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., Interlocutory Award, 19 
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120 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, 
Award, 12 April 2002, para. 107. 
121 GARCÍA-BOLÍVAR, Omar E. CASE COMMENT Railroad Development Corporation v Republic of 
Guatemala: The First CAFTA Award on the Merits. ICSID Review. 2013, 28(1), pp. 27–32. 
doi:10.1093/icsidreview/sit010 P. 28. 
For more detailed discussion on the sole effects and police powers doctrine, please see the Sections 3.1 and 3.2 in 
the Part “Right to Regulate and Indirect Expropriation”, Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
122 See, for example, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 281, 
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has been reached yet.123 Certain tribunals even expressly mentioned that it is very difficult to 
find a clear and one-fits-all stance towards the matter due to the diversity of aspects involved 
in each and every case calling for a well-tailored and facts-specific assessment with few or no 
generalisations being made.124 
Indeed, one could argue that certain guidance can be derived from the preceding practice 
as is often the case for different tribunals do refer to previously resolved investment disputes.125 
Notwithstanding, there is no such a thing as a doctrine of binding precedent and thus 
investment tribunals have often reached diverse conclusions based on similar facts and law.126 
Moreover, one of the elements that is highly affecting international tribunals’ decisions 
are the wordings of respective IIAs. As the tribunals are bound by IIAs under which they hear 
the case, they simply cannot read more into the wording thereof than there is. Thus, when 
formulating descriptions of the concept of indirect expropriation the tribunals usually refer 
specifically to the respective “expropriation clauses” of the IIAs in question.127  
Thereupon, as was concluded by SGS tribunal  
“although different tribunals […] should in general seek to act consistently with each 
other, in the end it must be for each tribunal to exercise its competence in accordance with 
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49. 
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the applicable law, which will by definition be different for each BIT and each Respondent 
State. Moreover, there is no doctrine of precedent in international law, if by precedent is 
meant a rule of the binding effect of a single decision. There is no hierarchy of 
international tribunals, and even if there were, there is no good reason for allowing the 
first tribunal in time to resolve issues for all later tribunals.”128 
2.1 Establishing indirect expropriation - essential elements 
Although different investment tribunals have brought many general descriptions of 
indirect expropriation there is still little agreement about the essential elements thereof.129  
As stems, however, from different decisions where the tribunals dealt with indirect 
expropriation, the matter intrinsically boils down to three fundamental factors. When 
establishing indirect expropriation, the tribunals usually assess the impact the state’s measures 
have on the investment, the duration of such measure, and interference with legitimate 
expectations of the investor in question.130  
Furthermore, depending on the test the investment tribunal decides to follow (whether 
police powers or sole effects doctrine) it will also have to include certain deliberation on the 
nature and purpose of the measures under the scrutiny. 
2.1.1 Impact of the measure on the investment 
First and foremost, certain impact inflicted by the activity of a state on the investment is a 
crucial aspect which must be found when establishing the case of indirect expropriation.131As 
the tribunal in Tecmed put it “[i]n determining whether a taking constitutes an “indirect 
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expropriation”, it is particularly important to examine the effect that such taking may have 
had on the investor’s rights”.132 
The investment tribunals have commonly agreed that when observing the state’s measures 
through the prism of indirect expropriation it is necessary to look for at least some degree of 
detrimental interference with the investment in question.133 Nevertheless, the magnitude of such 
interference has been approached with different amount of strictness.134 
In any case, it is without any doubt that the tribunal will not be satisfied with just any 
interference with the investment in question. For example, in the LG&E case it was held that 
“in many arbitral decisions, compensation has been denied when it [the State’s measure] has 
not affected all or almost all the investment’s economic value”.135 
One of the most stringent requirements on the degree of impact appeared in Mamidoil 
where “the decisive criterion for most tribunals is not the fact of having incurred a damage 
and/or the loss of value as such, but the finding “that the owner has truly lost all the attributes 
of ownership”.136 Similarly, in the Lauder case, the tribunal stated that the effect of taking must 
be “effectively neutralis[ing] the enjoyment of property’.”137 Additionally, the tribunal in 
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Sempra required that the value of the business had to be “virtually annihilated” in order to be 
deemed expropriated.138 
Another approach which is very close to the foregoing is the requirement of a “total or 
near total deprivation”.139 In Venezuela Holdings where the investor asserted that the new tax 
regime aggravated its investment which amounted to expropriation, the tribunal dismissed such 
a claim and held that “a deprivation requires either a total loss of the investment's value or a 
total loss of control by the investor of its investment, both of a permanent nature.” 140 
Very common is also a “substantial deprivation” test of the investment or its economic 
benefits which appeared for instance in the AWG case.141 
It appears that the least strict and more ambiguous requirement was put forth by the Pope 
& Talbot tribunal which concluded that “the interference must be sufficiently restrictive to 
support a conclusion that the property has been taken from the owner.”142  
Consequently, the effect imposed by the measure must be understood as follows: “the 
affected property must be impaired to such an extent that it must be seen as “taken”.”143 
As the degree of interference with the investment has been discussed it is also requisite to 
elaborate more on the precise elements of the investor’s activity which has to be substantially 
affected in order for indirect expropriation to be held. 
In principle, the requirement revolves around three alternative aspects that have to be 
affected in order for the investment to be deemed taken: “the effective loss of management, use 
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142 Pope & Talbot v Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, 26 June 2000, para. 102. 
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or control, or a significant depreciation of the value, of the assets of the foreign investor144.” 
However, not all the tribunals have agreed whether a sufficient interference with any of these 
aspects individually would constitute expropriation. 
Hence, for example the Novenergia II tribunal held that although the state’s measures had 
an impact on the investment, “they have nevertheless left unaffected the claimant’s proprietary 
rights”.145 Similarly, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Phillips Petroleum observed that  
“assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically and 
immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the government, 
thus requiring compensation under international law, such a conclusion is warranted 
whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of 
ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral.”146 
Contrarily, several cases revolved around the claims brought by investors not because the 
state’s measures caused a decrease in value of investment, but because it led to a loss of control, 
which prevented the investor from using or disposing of its investment.147 Hence in the Sempra 
case, for instance, the tribunal held that “a finding of indirect expropriation would require … 
that the investor no longer be in control of its business operation […].”148 
Additionally, in the ADM case tribunal deciding under NAFTA dismissed the claim based 
on the loss of profit stating that “the test for expropriation […] cannot be considered in the 
 
 
144 UNCTAD I, p. 2. 
For example, the Enron case tribunal (which referred to decision in the Pope & Talbot case) took into consideration 
all these aspects jointly when finding substantial deprivation in “depriving the investor of the control of the 
investment, managing the day-to-day operations of the company, arrest and detention of company officials or 
employees, supervision of the work of officials, interfering in the administration, impeding the distribution of 
dividends, interfering in the appointment of officials and managers, or depriving the company of its property or 
control in total or in part”. 
Enron Corporation, Ponderosa Assets LP v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May 
2007, para. 245. 
145 Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), SICAR v. Kingdom of Spain, 
SCC Arbitration (2015/063), Award, 15 February 2018, paragraph 761, page 173. 
146 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran et al., 21 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., Award, 29 June 
1989, para 97. 
147 UNCTAD II, p. 67. 
148 Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 28 September 
2007, para. 285. 
29 
 
abstract or based exclusively on the Claimants’ loss of profits, which is not necessarily a 
sufficient sole criterion for an expropriation. 149 
Equally, in the Biwater case the tribunal held that “the fact that the effect of conduct must 
be considered in deciding whether an indirect expropriation has occurred, does not necessarily 
import an economic test.”150 
Finally, it is contentious whether an effective deprivation alone would automatically 
constitute indirect expropriation. Mostly it would depend on the test the respective tribunal 
would choose to assess the factual background of the case.151  
2.1.2 Duration of the interference 
Second criterion frequently observed in arbitral practice is the timeframe of measures 
imposed on the investor in question. A rule of thumb is simple, the requirement often expressed 
is the one of “permanency”. 
This classical requirement of permanence appeared in Tecmed where it was held that “it 
is understood that the measures adopted by a State, whether regulatory or not, are an indirect 
de facto expropriation if they are irreversible and permanent …”; further the tribunal has 
clarified that such deprivation shall not be temporary.152 
Followingly, according to Dr. Kunoy in order to be deemed expropriatory the deprivation 
should not be merely ephemeral.153 Additionally, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Tippets case 
resorted to the same wording. At first, the tribunal acknowledged that the appointment of a 
temporary manager by the government could not itself be considered an act depriving 
property.154 As a matter of fact, it was the consequent absence of new developments in the 
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cooperation and lack of communication on the part of the government that was held 
expropriatory.155 Hence the tribunal held that the “owner was deprived of fundamental rights 
of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral.”156 
In the case Biwater the tribunal held that the requirement regarding the duration of 
interference with investment shall be for “at least a meaningful period of time.”157  
However, even though the S.D. Myers tribunal agreed with the aforementioned, it has also 
adopted a slightly less strict approach:  
“[a]n expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to 
make use of its economic rights although it may be that, in some contexts and 
circumstances, it would be appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an 
expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary.”158  
Contrarily, for example in Cement Shipping case the tribunal was satisfied with a 
temporary 4 months period deprivation of the investor’s rights it had been granted.159 
Therefore, it seems that the precise requirement as regards the duration of an interference 
with investment is of non-evanescence or non-ephemerality. 
2.1.3 Expectations of the investor 
Some of the tribunals also took into consideration legitimate expectations of the investors 




156 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., Award, 
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159 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, 
Award, 12 April 2002, para. 107. 
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According to prof. Reinisch in the ambit on international investment law, “the 
disappointment of legitimate investor expectations by host states may play a crucial factor […] 
also in the determination of whether an expropriation has taken place.”161 
But, for instance, the tribunal in EnCana conditioned the scrutiny of such a requirement 
by the previous commitments made by the state towards the investor. The tribunal observed 
that “[i]n the absence of a specific commitment from the host State, the foreign investor has 
neither the right nor any legitimate expectation that the tax regime will not change, perhaps 
to its disadvantage, during the period of the investment.”162 
In particular, this condition has its logical purpose for the investor simply cannot rely on 
the unchangeability of the law regime it operates under – not even in its home state. Hence, as 
regards the legitimate exercise of regulatory power of the state the S.D. Myers tribunal held that 
“regulation is something that [investors] ought reasonably to expect. It generally does not 
amount to an unfair surprise”.163 
In this context, however, for example the tribunal in Waste Management completely 
dismissed this notion and held in relation to “the reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit” 
that “the loss of benefits or expectations is not a sufficient criterion for an expropriation, even 
if it is a necessary one”164 
Additionally, some of the cases have even shown that such a focus on investor’s 
expectations might disrupt the regulatory flexibility of the state’s having a chilling effect on the 
state’s regulatory activity.165 Thus, based on the foregoing, it seems appropriate to include the 
legitimate expectations of the investors only in cases where those were given any specific 
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matter, “it is not the function of the international law of expropriation to eliminate the normal 
commercial risks of a foreign investor”.166 
2.1.4 Nature of the measures 
Finally, few words must be mentioned regarding the purpose or intent of the challenged 
measures on the grounds of indirect expropriation. This aspect is usually recognized by the 
tribunals applying the police powers doctrine, under which the assessment of the legitimate 
exercise of the right to adopt laws and other measures is requisite.167 Hence, the tribunals would 
often take into consideration the reasons and ambit of the adopted regulations. 
This element is not particularly crucial when establishing indirect expropriation, but it is 
mostly important when the tribunal is distinguishing between a compensable indirect 
expropriation and non-compensable legitimate regulatory act.168  
Nonetheless, sometimes the tribunals would also dig into the reasons behind the 
challenged measures in order to see whether there was any mala fide intention to deprive an 
investor of its property. 
Thus, for example in the Rusoro case where the tribunal assessed an alleged occurrence 
of creeping expropriation it held that Venezuela was not anyhow following “a hidden agenda 
to nationalise the private gold sector”.169  
Contrarily, in the Hulley Enterprises case upon a thorough scrutiny of the challenged 
measures and the state’s reasons for their adoption the tribunal held that the primary objective 
of Russia was not fulfil its legitimate fiscal sovereignty, but rather to cause the investor’s 
bankruptcy.170 
In conclusion, the Yukos tribunal also considered reasons lurking behind the state’s actions 
and held that “after having now traversed, at some length, the treatment of Yukos by Russian 
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tax authorities, the bailiffs and the courts, and having considered the totality of the evidence, 
especially the VAT evidence, the Tribunal has concluded that the primary objective of the 
Russian Federation was not to collect taxes but rather to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate its 
valuable assets.”171 
2.2 Measures (not)found to be expropriatory 
Although the investment tribunals have mostly decided in favour of the states, plentiful of 
the state’s measures were also held to be expropriatory.172 Those can be classified in accordance 
with their nature into several groups. According to prof. Newcombe and prof. Sornarajah this 
includes a wide variety of measures such as forced sales of property or shares, exorbitant or 
arbitrary taxation, taking over the management or control of a business enterprise, annulment 
and cancellation of property rights and necessary licenses or permits, total prohibition of the 
investor’s business activity or of the access thereof to a key supplier or natural resources, other 
harassment such as freezing of bank accounts, lockouts and labour shortages as well as failure 
to provide protection for the investor’s property against any other interference of third parties.173 
Similarly, the precise measures that are considered to amount to indirect expropriation were 
listed for example in the Award of Pope &Talbot case.174  
 
 
171 Yukos Universal Limited v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 226, UNCITRAL, Final award, 18 July 
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The International Law on Foreign Investment. 3rd ed. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010. P. 375. 
174 Pope & Talbot v Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, 26 June 2000, para 100: 
“Investment has been nationalized or that the Regime is confiscatory. […] the Investor remains in control of the 
Investment, it directs the day-to-day operations of the Investment, and no officers or employees of the Investment 
have been detained […]. Canada does not supervise the work of the officers or employees of the Investment, does 
not take any of the proceeds of company sales (apart from taxation), does not interfere with management or 
shareholders’ activities, does not prevent the Investment from paying dividends to its shareholders, does not 
interfere with the appointment of directors or management and does not take any other actions ousting the Investor 
from full ownership and control of the Investment.” 
Moreover, as was concluded in Enron case this list of the measures is a representative of the legal standard required 
to make a finding of indirect expropriation.  
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Contrarily, in many more cases the state’s measures such as omissions and legitimate 
changes in laws or rates of VAT exemptions did not reach the threshold of indirect 
expropriation.175 Either it was because the investors failed to substantiate a significant adverse 
impact on the investment thereof or the state’s measures were not capable of amounting to 
indirect expropriation in the first place. 
The tribunals’ insight helped to create a certain array of guidelines for assessing other 
measures from an indirect expropriation perspective. Nevertheless, for completion of the 
foregoing, the following has to be taken with a grain of salt due to the fact that no matter how 
the states’ measures are similar in appellation, all the cases have different legal and factual 
backgrounds and were being resolved under different IIAs which can have a major impact on 
the tribunal’s decision. 
2.2.1 Withdrawal of licences, certificates and permits 
One of the most frequently scrutinized measures before the international tribunals is an 
alleged withdrawal or non-renewal of licences or permits that are essential for the foreign 
investor’s ability to conduct its business.176 
What often happens is that upon the issuance of the license under which an investor is 
legitimated to operate its business, the state issues a decree or other regulation revoking such 
license, or even banning the given permitted activity. 
That was the case, for instance, in Cement Shipping where the Claimant had been 
operating under a licence import, docking and dispatching cement in Egypt when, suddenly, 
the privileges granted thereto were de facto revoked by the Decree No. 195 prohibiting import 
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of all kinds of Portland Cement.177 The tribunal found a de facto revocation of the Claimant’s 
license by the decree and Egypt’s conduct thereafter expropriatory.178  
Alternatively, indirect expropriation was also found in cases where the validity of a license 
or certificate was contingent on a regular renewal by the host state. In such cases, indirect 
expropriation was found where the State did not renew such license or permit without any 
reasonable ground.179 
Lastly, several cases involved withdrawals of certificates or arbitrary refusal to grant a 
permit to the investor.180 One of them was Goetz were the claim emerged from an alleged 
withdrawal of a certificate of free zone conferring tax and customs exemptions which was held 
to be a measure tantamount to expropriation “depriving of or restricting property rights.”181 
Additionally, a case of expropriation was established in Crystallex v. Venezuela. Here, the 
Claimant, a gold mining company, was arbitrarily refused the necessary authorization after it 
was specifically reassured by the government that all the permits will be granted. 
On the contrary, in some cases182 a withdrawal or non-renewal of the licences were not 
deemed to amount to indirect expropriation either because the respective authorities were acting 
within their legitimate discretion in a non-discriminatory or there were breaches found on the 
part of the investors.183 
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statutory discretion when it took the steps that it did, for the reasons that it did, to revoke EIB’s license. Its 
ultimate decision cannot be said to have been arbitrary or discriminatory against the foreign investors in the sense 
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2.2.2 Exorbitant taxation and other tax measures 
In the process of the conduct of international investment relations, taxation imposed upon 
foreign investors is an important and inherent part of the interaction between such investors and 
host states.184 Hence, it is not surprising that a significant number of investment disputes have 
also revolved around the measures of taxation.185  
The problem is, that, by their very nature, those measures are an appropriation of property 
for which no compensation is due, even if taxation reaches fifty or sixty percent (which is quite 
common in some of the host states).186 Furthermore, by definition, taxation is a matter of 
achievement of other social and political objectives (e.g. support for domestic industry, 
redistribution of wealth, etc.) and ceding this attribute of the state’s fiscal sovereignty to the 
scrutiny of international bodies would be deemed surrendering thereof which could curtail the 
states’ discretion over the tax policy.187 Consequently, tax measures are usually covered by 
reservations or exceptions clauses188 excluding those measures from the scope of the respective 
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IIAs making the assessment thereof very troublesome in the cases involving indirect 
expropriation allegations. 
At the same time, however, such notion of the fiscal sovereignty provides for a certain 
passage of arbitrary, discriminatory and excessive tax measures. Thus, apart from the 
aforementioned denials, withdrawals or non-renewals of permits and licenses, the cases 
involving taxation measures were mostly decided in favour of the investors.189  
One of the cases which involved a significant number of tax measures and was decided in 
favour of the aggrieved investor is Tza Yap Shum.190 In this case, claims have arisen from 
seizure of the investor’s bank account due to tax debt and other actions of Peruvian tax 
authorities such as tax assessment, tax audits and interim measures.191  
The tribunal observed that: 
“under international law, a State is not liable for the loss of value of property or for other 
economic disadvantages that result from the good faith imposition of general taxes, 
regulations, or other conduct commonly accepted as part of the police powers of the state. 
The creation, administration, and collection of taxes form part of the taxation power of 
the states.”192 
However, it also added that “the imposition of taxation measures or their enforcement may 
be expropriatory if they are confiscatory, arbitrary, abusive, or discriminatory.” 193 On the 
grounds of which it held that Peru was liable for the adoption of the said measures. 
Similar conclusion was reached by the tribunal in Feldman which dealt with the denial of 
benefits of a law that allowed certain tax refunds to the claimant. Although its reasoning, the 
tribunal concluded that “non-discriminatory, bona fide general taxation does not establish 
liability”, with the reference to the Restatement (Third) it also asserted that in some cases the 
taxation can ripen to expropriation. 
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A different situation appeared in Hulley Enterprises194 where the claims stemmed from 
the tax measures imposed by Russia. Additionally, the tax measures were also accompanied by 
a series of actions which included criminal prosecutions, harassment of the investor, its 
employees and related persons and entities, massive tax reassessments, VAT charges, fines, 
asset freezes and other measures to enforce the tax reassessments, culminating jointly in the 
bankruptcy of the investor.”195 The tribunal made a thorough assessment of the measures 
altogether and the intention therebehind finding that the primary objective of Russia was not to 
fulfil its legitimate fiscal sovereignty, but rather to cause the investor’s bankruptcy.196 
On the other hand, in EnCana the tribunal rejected a claim based on the denial of VAT 
refunds by the government of Ecuador to two of the investor’s subsidiaries.197 The EnCana 
tribunal refused to find any case of expropriation based on these allegations and find the states’ 
tax measures unreasonable. It held, referring to Feldman and the Restatement, that  
“all taxation reduces the economic benefits an enterprise would otherwise derive from the 
investment; it will only be in an extreme case that a tax which is general in its incidence 
could be judged as equivalent in its effect to an expropriation of the enterprise which is 
taxed.”198  
Conformably with the foregoing, the tribunal in ADM has not found a case of indirect 
expropriation caused by adopted tax measures. 
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After pointing out that the sole effects test is according to the doctrine a leading approach 
to the assessment of the cases of indirect expropriation, it came to the conclusion that “the 
degree of interference caused by the Tax on the Claimants’ investment does not amount to an 
indirect expropriation because: (i) the investors remained in full ownership and control of their 
investment […]; (ii) the investors remained in full possession and of their production […].”199 
Similarly, the denial of certain tax exemptions in Albacora v. Ecuador was not found to 
be expropriatory either.200 
2.2.3 Other measures and harassment 
Lastly, there are many more aspects of the foreign investor’s business which the states can 
interfere with as well as many different tools which can be used to do so. 
Thus, among other measures that were found to be expropriatory is an expulsion of the 
key figure for the investor inferred by an ad hoc tribunal ruling under UNCITRAL rules in 
Biloune case. 201 According to the tribunal Biloune was such an important entity that by his 
expulsion, together with other measures, the business was severely deprived: 
“the conjunction of the stop work order, the demolition, the summons, the arrest, the 
detention, the requirement of filing assets declaration forms, and the deportation of Mr. 
Biloune without possibility of re-entry had the effect of causing the irreparable cessation 
of work on the project. Given the central role of Mr. Biloune in promoting, financing 
and managing MDCL, his expulsion from the country effectively [constituted 
constructive expropriation].”202 
According to prof. Sornarajah, the so-called indigenisation measures also constitute 
indirect expropriation.203 When these measures occur, a “progressive transfer of ownership 
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Cambridge University Press, 2010. P. 380. 
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from foreign interests into the hands of local shareholders” takes place which partly resembles 
the situations of direct seizure.204 
Many cases have also involved a chain of measures where investors found themselves 
under a weight of harassment from the part of the respective host state. In fact, in investment 
arbitrations it is common that the claims revolve around several state’s measures at time, rather 
than one measure, which either jointly or individually substantially affect the investment in 
question. However, in cases of “regulatory harassment” the variety of measures is adopted with 
one intention – to make the operation of the investor’s business unbearable. In the Hydro case 
these measures included tax audit proceedings, seizure and sequestration of bank accounts and 
assets, money laundering investigations, and arrest warrants against individual claimants.205 
Likewise in Stati the harassment was designed to pressure the investors into selling their 
investments to the state-owned oil company by a combination of imprisonment of employees 
upon baseless criminal allegations, Financial Police investigations, fines, and tax threats.206 
Finally, there was also a certain deliberation regarding the question whether omissions on 
the part of the host state, rather than actions, could constitute expropriation as well. According 
to prof. McLachlan, who mostly referred to the Olguin decision, inactivity of states is rather 
insufficient in order to stand a case of indirect expropriation no matter how egregious these 
omissions might be.207 On the contrary, in the case Eureko the tribunal refused to follow such 
a restrictive point of view stating that “it is obvious that the rights of an investor can be violated 




205 Hydro S.r.l. and others v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/28, Decision on Claimants’ Request 
for a Partial Award and Respondent’s Application for Revocation or Modification of the Order on Provisional 
Measures, 1 September 2016, para. 1.4 et seq. 
206 Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. 
V 116/2010, Award, 19 December 2013, para. 15. 
207 MCLACHLAN, Campbell, SHORE, Laurence and WEINIGER, Matthew. International investment arbitration 
substantive principles. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 381-382, paras. 8.71-8.72; Olguín v Paraguay, 
ICSID Case No ARB/98/5, Award, 26 Jule 2001, para 84.  
208 Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Ad Hoc Tribunal (UNCITRAL), Partial Award, 19 August 2005, para. 186. 
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3. INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION IN IIAS PRACTICE 
Vast majority of IIAs, especially the modern ones, reflect the multifariousness of cases 
concerning the states’ interference with foreign investors’ property. As regards the two types 
of expropriation described previously, both direct and indirect expropriation (with certain 
exceptions209) are usually expressly included in the provisions concerning expropriation in 
contemporary IIAs.210 Moreover, states recently started to include into IIAs annexes and 
protocols with further clarification of the state’s conduct (not)amounting to indirect 
expropriation in a fairly thorough and detailed manner.211 
Although both the ISDS practice and scholarly works failed to bring any uniform 
description concerning the measures that would constitute indirect expropriation, there are 
certain elements that are rather essential for “expropriation” provisions and appear in most of 
the IIAs.212 According to UNCTAD, the provisions regarding expropriation commonly contain:  
“(i) definition of the concepts of direct and indirect expropriation; 
(ii) clarification that expropriation occurs with respect to tangible or intangible property 
rights and property rights in an investment;213 
(iii) clarification that an assessment of indirect expropriation involves a case-by-case 
factual inquiry (which usually involves the assessment of an economic impact of the 
 
 
209 See, for example, one of the most recent BITs, Brazil - Guyana BIT (2018), explicitly reads in its Art. 7 that it 
“[…] only provides for direct expropriation, where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly 
expropriated through formal transfer of title or ownership rights, and does not cover indirect expropriation.”  
210 See, for example, Canada Model BIT (2014), Art. 13; German Model BIT (2008), Art. 4; Energy Charter Treaty 
34 ILM 360 (1995), (2014), Art. 13; North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA, 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993), 
Art. 1100; U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement CAFTA, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988), Art. 1605; 
 “[…] neither Party shall nationalize or expropriate a covered investment either directly, or indirectly […]”. 
211 See, for example, Canada Model BIT (2014), Annex B.13(1); “For greater certainty, Article 13(1) shall be 
interpreted in accordance with Annex B.13(1) on the clarification of indirect expropriation.” 
212 APEC, Core Elements of IIAs: A Cross-regional Comparative Study, March 2010, Committees, CTI Sub-Fora 
& Industry Dialogues Groups, Investment Experts’ Group (IEG), Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI), pp. 
9-10; Accessed online [https://www.apec.org/Publications/2010/03/Core-Elements-of-IIAs-A-Cross-regional-
Comparative-Study].  
213 See, for example, China-New Zealand FTA (2008), Art. 145; Annex 13 
“Expropriation 
1. An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible 
or intangible property right or property interest in an investment.”. 
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measure, interference with distinct and reasonable investment-backed expectations; and 
nature and characteristics of the measure);214  
(iv) establish a presumption of the non-expropriatory nature with respect to non-
discriminatory measures of general application designed and applied to protect public 
welfare objectives.”215 
3.1 Concepts of direct and indirect expropriation in IIAs 
Typically, based on the chosen terminology in a treaty, modern IIAs can be divided into 
two categories. 216  
The first category commonly contains the wording that either mentions direct and indirect 
expropriation with no further elaboration or distinguishes expropriation and measures 
“equivalent to”, “tantamount to” or “similar to” expropriation.217  
 
 
214 See, for example, Eurasian Economic Union - Viet Nam FTA (2015); Article 8.35 
“Expropriation and Compensation 
The determination of whether a measure or series of such measures of either Party to this Chapter have an 
effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation shall require a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry to consider, 
inter alia: 
a) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the sole fact that a measure or 
series of measures of either Party to this Chapter has an adverse effect on the economic value of 
investments does not establish that an expropriation has occurred; 
b) the character of the measure or series of measures of either Party to this Chapter.” 
215 UNCTAD II, p. 72. 
216 NIKIÈMA, Suzy H. Best Practices Indirect Expropriation. The International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD). 2012. P. 5  
217 See, for example, Armenia - Netherlands BIT (2005), Art. 6;  
“[…] any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, investors of the other Contracting Party […]” 
Czech Republic - Switzerland BIT (1990), Art. 6; China - Romania BIT (1994), Article 4.; 
“[…] expropriation or nationalisation or similar measures/measures with similar effect […]” 
Czech Republic - Sri Lanka BIT (2011), Art. 5; Vietnam - Latvia BIT (1995), Art. 5; 
“[…] nationalized, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation […]” 
Japan - Saudi Arabia BIT (2013), Art. 9; Germany - Poland BIT (1989), Art. 4.2; Argentina - Greece BIT (1999), 
Art. 4; Israel - Estonia BIT (1994), Art. 5.1; 
“[…] expropriate or nationalize investments of investors of the other Contracting Party or take any measure 
tantamount to expropriation or nationalization […]”. 
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The second category of IIAs recognizes all the aforementioned terms together; meaning 
direct, indirect expropriation as well as other measures which are “tantamount to” or 
“equivalent to” expropriation or “have the same or similar effect” as expropriation.218  
Some of those IIAs include the wordings “with the effect similar to expropriation” or 
“equivalent to expropriation” in order to further outline the measures which would constitute 
indirect expropriation.219 Nevertheless, however this phrasing might seem necessary, according 
to practice it is not quite the case for investment tribunals usually assess the host state’s 
measures under the so called “effects test” regardless the occurrence of such wording in IIA.220  
Interestingly, and this may be counted also as the third sui generis category, wordings of 
some of the oldest IIAs (specifically the ones with Germany) referring only to expropriation 
with no further clarification were subsequently amended by protocols explicating the terms 




218 See, for example, North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA, 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993), Art. 1100;  
“1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party 
in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment 
("expropriation"), except […].”; 
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement CAFTA, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988), Art. 10.7 
“No Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures 
equivalent to expropriation or nationalization (“expropriation”),[…].”; 
BLEU (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union) - Libya BIT (2004), Art. 7; 
“[…] not to adopt any measure of expropriation or nationalisation or any other measure having the effect of 
directly or indirectly dispossessing the investors of the other Contracting Party of their investments in its 
territory.”. 
219 See, for example, Egypt - Finland BIT (2004), Art., 5; Kenya - Switzerland BIT (2006), Art. 6. 
220 MEG, Kinnear N., BJORKLUND, Andrea K., and HANNAFORD, John F. G. Investment disputes under 
NAFTA: An Annotated Guide To NAFTA. 2006 Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
P. 1110-15. 
221 Germany - Pakistan BIT (1959); Germany - Malaysia BIT (1960);  
Those treaties, at the first place, commonly read “[Investor] of either Party shall not be subjected to expropriation 
of their investments […] except for […].”; 
The protocols then specified that “The term “expropriation” […] shall also pertain to acts of sovereign power 
which are tantamount to expropriation, as well as measures of nationalization.”. 
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3.2 Recent trends in treaty practice concerning indirect expropriation 
Contemporary trends in treaty practice seem to be revolved around two main matters.222 
Firstly, many recent IIAs started to reflect the need for closer specification of measures that fall 
within the scope of indirect expropriation. Secondly, many modern IIAs affirm and further 
adjust the state’s right to regulate in public purpose (especially regarding environmental and 
health issues) in connection with the phenomenon of indirect expropriation. 
3.2.1 Guidelines on the assessment of indirect expropriation 
Plenty of recent treaties took the step towards greater clarification and specification of the 
relevant indicators of what measures constitute indirect expropriation. 223  
To some degree, clarification concerning the assessment of attributes of measures 
amounting to indirect expropriation appeared in the late 70s when the parties to IIAs began to 
conclude protocols that further delineated certain provisions thereof.224  
For instance, 1979 Germany - Romania BIT Protocol explained that  
““Expropriation” shall mean any kind of official measures that withdraw or restrict right 
of ownership or any other rights constituting a capital investment or part of a capital 
investment, as well as any other official measures that in their effect on the investment are 
tantamount to an expropriation.”225 
Interestingly, 1984 Congo - US BIT Protocol provided rather detailed description by 
stating: 
“Direct or indirect measures tantamount to expropriation as used in Article III(l) may 
include the levying of taxes equivalent to indirect expropriation, the compulsory sale of 
all or part of an investment, or the impairment or deprivation of the management, control, 
or economic value of an investment”.226 
 
 
222 UNCTAD II, p. 22. 
223 UNCTAD II, p. 57. 
224 DOLZER, Rudolph and STEVENS, Margrete. Bilateral Investment Treaties. The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995. P 101. 
225 Germany - Romania BIT (1979), Protocol, p.386, para. 2. 
226 Democratic Republic of the Congo – United States of America BIT (1984); Protocol, p.18, para. 5. 
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Current IIAs, in order to describe the attributes of indirect expropriation, commonly use 
either explanatory sections to articles concerning expropriation or annexes (usually in more 
extensive multilateral agreements).227  
Annexes and explanatory sections usually have fairly similar wordings and very often 
unanimously call for a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry.228 Additionally, they provide with a 
list of several relevant factors that need to be taken into account in order to decide whether or 
not a measure constitutes an indirect expropriation. 
For instance, Annex 1 of 2018 EU - Singapore Investment Protection Agreement reads as 
follows:  
“The determination […] requires a case-by-case […] inquiry that considers, among other 
factors: 
(a) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures and its duration, although 
the fact that a measure or a series of measures by a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect 
expropriation has occurred; 
(b) the extent to which the measure or series of measures interferes with the possibility 
to use, enjoy or dispose of the property; and  




227 In case of annexes, the treaties usually include general provisions concerning expropriation with identification 
of direct and indirect expropriation, other terms as well as requirements for the takings to be lawful. The footnotes 
under those provisions then refer to the annexes stating that “[Article] shall be interpreted in accordance with 
Annex [XY]”. 
228 See, for example, Australia - Indonesia CEPA (2019), Annex 14-B, para.3; ASEAN - Hong Kong, China SAR 
Investment Agreement (2017), Annex 2, para.3; Trans-Pacific Partnership (2016), Annex 9-B, para. 3; Chile - 
Hong Kong, China SAR BIT (2016), Annex 1, para. 3; 
“The determination of whether a measure or series of measures by a Party, in a specific situation, constitutes an 
indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers […]”. 
229 Similarly see, for instance, China – Republic of Korea FTA (2015), Annex 12-B; Australia – Indonesia CEPA 
(2019), Annex 14-B; Argentina – Japan BIT (2018), Art. 11, Section 3; China – United Republic of Tanzania BIT 
(2013), Art.6; Armenia – Singapore Agreement on Trade in Services and Investment (2019), Annex 3-A. 
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These factors are sometimes referred to as the three-prong “Penn Central test”, since they 
originated from the doctrine developed by the US Supreme Court.230  
 
3.2.2 Reaffirmation of the state’s right to regulate and general exceptions in IIAs 
Contemporary trends in treaty practice also include provisions confirming and recognizing 
the state’s right to regulate.231 The rationale behind is mostly the fact that certain regulatory 
measures of states needed to be excluded from the scope of compensable expropriations as 
otherwise the states internationally recognized right to regulate could be overly curtailed.232 
Generally, those provisions set forth that “none of the provisions in the treaty shall prevent 
any of the contracting States from taking measures that protect certain public interests (e.g., 
public health, human, animal or plant life, the environment, national security, maintenance and 
improvement of labour rights, etc.)”.233 
The two following Parts of the thesis – on the states’ right to regulate and general 





230 BURGHETTO, María, Beatriz and LORFING, Pascale, Accaoui. The Evolution and Current Status of the 
Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Investment Arbitration and Investment Treaties. Indian Journal of Arbitration 
Law. 2017, VI (2), pp. 98 -123. P.100; See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
231 BÜCHELER, Gebhard. Proportionality in investor-state arbitration. 1st ed. Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford 
University Press, 2015. P.122. 
232 For further discussion, see the following Part of this thesis. 
233 See, for example, Australia - China FTA (2015), Article 9.8; Finland-El Salvador BIT (2002), Article 14; 
Gabon-Turkey BIT (2012), Article 5. 
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RIGHT TO REGULATE AND INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
1. THE STATE’S FREEDOM TO REGULATE  
The idea of the state’s police powers or the capability to regulate its own internal matters 
has a very long historical development. The term police powers itself originates from the Latin 
“pŏlītīa”234 which can be described as “the administration of the Commonwealth”.235 
According to Adam Smith, who gave his lectures at the University of Glasgow in the 18th 
century, the right to regulate signified “the regulation of the inferiour parts of government” 
which in detail de facto comprehended: 
“the regulations made in order to preserve cleanliness of the roads, streets, etc. and 
prevent the bad effects of corrupting and putrifying substances;[…] the security of the 
people [by] preventing all crimes and disturbances which may interrupt the intercourse 
or destroy the peace of the society by any violent attacks[…].”236 
It follows that this conception of the regulatory power has not changed a lot since the 18th 
century scholarly writings as in its widest understanding it still encompasses “regulation, 
discipline, and control of the community, its civil administration and the maintenance of public 
order.”237 
As regards the contemporary connotation of the term, the Black’s law dictionary describes 
the right to regulate as  
“[an] inherent and plenary power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper 
to preserve the public security, order, health, morality, and justice. It is a fundamental 
 
 
234 LEGGARE, Santiago. The Historical Background Of The Police Power. Journal of Constitutional Law. 2002, 
9(3), 745-796. P. 748. 
235 LEWIS, Charlton T., SHORT, Charles. A Latin Dictionary Founded on Andrews' Edition of Freund's Latin 
Dictionary [online]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956. [Accessed on 3.11.2019] from Perseus Digital Library 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Dpolitia. 
236 SMITH, Adam. The Glasgow edition of the works and correspondence of Adam Smith. Indianapolis, IN : 
Liberty Fund, 1982. P. 331. 
237 LEGGARE, Santiago. The Historical Background Of The Police Power. Journal of Constitutional Law. 2002, 
9(3), 745-796. P. 761. 
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power essential to government, and it cannot be surrendered by the legislature or 
irrevocably transferred away from the government.”238 
Concerning the term “power of a sovereign”, the sovereignty of states is generally 
characterized as a conglomerate of “powers and privileges resting on customary law which are 
independent of the particular consent of another state”.239 According to prof. Crawford the 
concept thereof represents a “basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations, which governs 
a community consisting primarily of states having, in principle, a uniform legal personality”.240 
As appositely explained Judge Weiss in his dissenting opinion in the Lotus case, the 
sovereignty is a paramount rule of international law that does not require to be embodied in any 
treaty for “if the states were not sovereign, no international law would be possible”.241 
Accordingly, an exercise of the state’s sovereign power cannot be nullified by any treaty.242 
Thus, for instance in the case Wimbledon the PCIJ declined “to see in the conclusion of any 
[t]reaty by which a [s]tate undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act 
an abandonment of its sovereignty” as “[t]he right of entering into international engagements 
is an attribute of state sovereignty.”243 
Essentially, it is a commonly accepted principle of international law that the states as 
sovereigns are endowed with the right to regulate.244 As a matter of fact, the state’s internal 
 
 
238 GARNER, Bryan. Black’s Law Dictionary. 10th ed. United States of America : Thomson Reuters, 2014. P. 
1344. [entry to “police powers”] 
239 CRAWFORD, James. Brownlie's principles of public international law. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 2012. P. 448; HERDEGEN, Mathias. Principles of International Economic Law. 2nd ed.  Oxford : Oxford 
University Press, 2016. P. 77. 
240 CRAWFORD, James. Brownlie's principles of public international law. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 2012. P. 447. 
241 As was mentioned in Lotus case by Judge Weiss: “[Sovereignty] does not even require to be embodied in a 
treaty: that is the rule sanctioning the sovereignty of States. If States were not sovereign, no international law 
would be possible, since the purpose of this law precisely is to harmonize and reconcile the different sovereignties 
over which it exercises its sway.” (The Case of the S.S. ‘Lotus’, France v Turkey, PCIJ Series A, No. 10, 4, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weiss, 7 September 1927, para. 121). 
242 RAJPUT, Aniruddha. Regulatory freedom and indirect expropriation in investment arbitration. Netherlands : 
Wolters Kluwer, 2019. P. 103. 
243 The SS ‘Wimbledon’, United Kingdom and ors v Germany, PCIJ Series A no 1, ICGJ 235 (PCIJ 1923), 
Judgment, 17th August 1923, League of Nations (historical) [LoN]; Permanent Court of International Justice 
(historical) [PCIJ]. Para. 35. 
244 SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The International Law on Foreign Investment. 3rd ed. New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. P. 367; DERAINS, Yves and SICARD-MIRABAL, Josefa. Chapter 5: 
Expropriation. In: Introduction to Investor-State Arbitration. Alphen aan den Rijn : Wolters Kluwer, 2018, pp. 
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regulatory activity within the ambit of its territory is perceived as a rule of customary 
international law245 and deemed to be a crucial attribute of the state’s sovereignty.246 Referring 
to the decision of the Fisheries Case, the state’s right to regulate is one of the “essential 
elements of sovereignty… to be exercised within territorial limits.”247 
From the conceptual point of view, the idea of the state’s right to regulate represents an 
“affirmation of states’ authority to act as sovereigns on behalf of the will of the people” in order 
to adjust the most important aspects of the existence of society.248 It is thus within the state’s 
sovereign power to adopt regulations that are deemed necessary or beneficial for any of the 
society-wide objectives.249 In general, it refers to all forms of domestic regulation such as laws 
or statutes, regulations, directives and other acts of the legislature as well as the executive.250 
In practice, it usually covers ordinary measures concerning taxation, antitrust, consumer 




115 – 132. P. 115; The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v United States of America), PCA Case 
No. XI RIAA 167, Award 7 September 1910, para. 174.  
245 RAJPUT, Aniruddha. Regulatory freedom and indirect expropriation in investment arbitration. Netherlands : 
Wolters Kluwer, 2019, ISBN 978-94-035-0625-8. P. 107; The existence of the right to regulate has been mostly 
regarded as a rule of customary international law. See, for example, Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v 
The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, para. 119; Saluka Investments 
B.V. v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para. 262; Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa 
v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (also known as Marvin Feldman v. Mexico), Award, 16 
December 2002, 103; Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 August 
2005, para. 410. 
246 See, for example, Oscar Chinn Case (1934) PCIJ Series A/B No. 63. 
247 The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, (Great Britain / United States of America), PCA Case No. 1909-01, 
Award, 7 September 1910, p. 181. 
248 MOUYAL, Lone Wandahl. International investment law and the right to regulate: a human rights perspective. 
New York : Routledge, 2018. P.8. 
249 Ibid. P.31. 
250 NEWCOMBE, Andrew. The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law. ICSID Review – 
Foreign Investment Law Journal. 20 (1), 2005, pp. 1-57. P. 26. 
251 SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The International Law on Foreign Investment. 3rd ed. New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. P. 374. 
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Concludingly, due to its customary origin and an inherent connection to the state’s 
sovereignty, the existence of the right to regulate should not be questioned “unless one is 
aiming at the total dissolution of state functions”.252  
Following all the foregoing, the question is not whether at all the states are allowed to 
make the necessary regulations, but what has to be rather examined is whether the state’s right 
to regulate has its place within the network of IIAs and if affirmative, then where are the limits 
of an execution thereof. 
Precisely, the questions begin to swarm when we stop thinking about the existence of the 
right to regulate and the concept thereof in a terminological “vacuum” (i.e. without other 
variables involved), but, on the other hand, in relation to other parallel maxims, rights and 
concepts. Firstly, it is important to state that in the realm of international law the states do not 
exist as isolated entities but rather as interrelated “partners” which are concluding different 
kinds of international instruments such as treaties or agreements. Hence, neither the concept of 
sovereignty nor the state’s right to regulate as its component must be understood as absolute, 
i.e. unfettered and unretractable maxims.253 
According to prof. Seidl-Hohenveldern, the notion of absolute sovereignty as it had 
existed since the Middle Ages has already outgrown itself, being transformed into the “relative 
sovereignty” under the connotation of which also other rules are allowed to govern the 
reciprocal relations between the states.254 
Thus, speaking in the context of international investment law, by concluding IIAs the 
states are inevitably accepting limitations upon their sovereignty.255 Otherwise, if the states 
would refuse such point of view and insisted on the fact that the international investment 
protection is in violation of their sovereignty, we would be back in times of the absolute 
 
 
252 VICUÑA, Francisco Orrego. Regulatory Authority and Legitimate Expectations: Balancing the Rights of the 
State and the Individual under International Law in a Global Society. International Law Forum du droit 
international. 2003. 5(3), pp.188-197. P. 192. 
253 HERDEGEN, Mathias. Principles of International Economic Law. 2nd ed.  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
2016. P. 78. 
254 SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, Ignaz. International economic law: general course on public international law. 
Dordrecht : M. Nijhoff, 1987. 19,20. 
255 SUBEDI, P. Surya. International investment law: reconciling policy and principle. Oxford : Hart Publishing 
Ltd., 2016. P. 161. 
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sovereignty, i.e. the Middle Ages, with essentially no international relations possible 
whatsoever.256  
As was fittingly concluded in the Texaco case, upon assuming international obligations 
through the means of miscellaneous written legal documents, a state simply cannot 
“invoke its sovereignty to disregard commitments […] and cannot, through measures 
belonging to its internal order, make null and void the rights of the contracting party 
which has performed its various obligations under the contract.”257 
In fact, as the state’s right to adopt laws stems from its sovereign power, the right to 
regulate ends where ends the sovereignty thereof.258 
Following the aforesaid, the latest development shows that an apple of discord is hidden 
in the very relationship between the public and private interests; between the state’s right to 
regulate and, in a way, exorbitant protection of the investors. Many questions regarding the 
state’s right to regulate within international investment law was brought to the spotlight, as it 
became indispensable to delineate the state’s legislative discretions and the protection of the 
investors’ proprietary rights.259  
Before proceeding further, at this point of the discussion on the matter at hand, it seems 
rather felicitous to stop with a brief “interpretative intermission”.  
For the sake of clarity, it bares noting that sundry scholars, while addressing the states’ 
ability to adopt laws, often use the terms “regulatory freedom”, “freedom to regulate”, “police 
powers” and “right to regulate” interchangeably.260 Thus, in order to preserve clear and 
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consistent terminology when referring to the state’s police powers or regulatory freedom, this 
thesis hereinafter stays with the term “right to regulate”.261 
2. RIGHT TO REGULATE IN THE CONTEXT OF INDIRECT EXROPRIATION 
In the introduction of the following chapter, it appears to be apposite to borrow as an 
underpinning thought the question expressed by prof. Lowe in his article concerning the 
relationship of regulatory and expropriatory activities: 
“How far do governments have to ‘buy back’ from foreign investors the right to regulate 
their economies?”262 
Following the aforesaid, the phenomenon of indirect expropriation is indeed very complex 
with many loopholes to be still covered. Nevertheless, the main thought behind the concept of 
indirect expropriation is rather clear – protecting investors’ proprietary rights from not only 
direct seizure of investment but also from covert takings caused by miscellaneous regulatory 
measures whether separately or in conjunction with each other. 
Putting it simply, indirect expropriation is usually found where the state’s regulatory 
activity interferes with an investment so severely that the enjoyment or use thereof is rendered 
practically impossible.263 Consequently, the state is held liable for such regulations and thus is 
obliged to compensate the aggrieved investor.264 In order to find the state’s measures 
expropriatory the tribunals and scholars were often satisfied with the sole presence of an adverse 
impact on the investment; no formal transfer of the property, no mala fide intention of the state 
to expropriate, not even the presence of the state’s enrichment was required in order to establish 
indirect expropriation. Such an approach gave the tribunals vastly extensive adjudicative power 
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while also expanded the protection of the investors at the expense of regulatory powers of the 
states.265 
Conversely, in consideration of the foregoing, what if the need for adoption of a regulation 
stems from the state’s international obligations or is imperative in order to preserve the state’s 
security, health or environment? Alternatively, what if the regulatory actions are actually 
regulatory “reactions” induced by the commercial activity of the said investor substantively 
jeopardizing the state’s economic sector or environment, health and other important objectives? 
Would it still be fair and reasonable to require the state to compensate in these cases?  
With that in mind, the other no less important side of the coin called “indirect 
expropriation” is the protection of the state’s regulatory activity which currently appears to be 
fairly oppressed by the investors’ protection under the concept of indirect expropriation.266  
In the contemporary industrialized world, the states have to have the possibility to remain 
flexible legislature in order to protect environment, health, other important objectives as well 
as meet their obligations stemming from miscellaneous international agreements and treaties.267 
And of course, in the process of fulfilling such obligations and protecting the society-wide 
interests, the state’s measures can often have adverse effects on foreign investors which in turn 
leads to the claims brought before the respective investment tribunals against such host states.268 
Consequently, the developments in international investment area inevitably led to the 
escalating tension between the concept of indirect expropriation and the state’s right to 
regulate.269 As the aftermath, according to prof. Choukroune this matter has acquired certain 
prominence due to the gravity thereof and as a corollary of many disputes brought before the 
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investment tribunals on the grounds of strict economy, taxation or environment regulatory 
measures.270 
The truly crucial issue in modern international investment law revolving around the 
relationship between indirect expropriation and regulatory freedom is that the line therebetween 
has not been clearly defined.271 That is partly caused by the everlasting problem lurking in the 
very divergence of the public and private interests, of the states’ and investors’ rights. It is as 
sure as death and taxes that the investors will endeavour to keep the scope of the concept of 
indirect expropriation as extensive as possible; the states, on the contrary, will strive to narrow 
its limits by expanding the scope of their non-compensable regulatory activities.272 
Furthermore, the lack of guidelines for delineation of the borderlines between these interests 
aggravates the situation. To be more accurate, it is very uncertain to what extent are the states 
able to adjust their internal issues by the means of regulations before triggering responsibilities 
under IIAs, i.e. the subsequent obligation to compensate the aggrieved investors.273  
Hence, the scholars, arbitrators and states have recently started to pursue the balanced 
approach to the matter which would support the general right of states to regulate on one hand 
and help preserving the high standard of the investors’ protection.274 Most of all, the states 
started to include more sophisticated provisions in their IIAs not only as regard the scope of the 
concept of indirect expropriation but also certain reservations and exceptions that further 
reaffirm their right to regulate. 
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Some of the tribunals have also developed certain tests and approaches which were to 
distinguish the expropriatory and regulatory measures.275 However, no versatile approach has 
been discovered yet. In fact, as was addressed, for example, in El Paso case “no absolute 
position can be taken in such delicate measures, where contradictory interests have to be 
reconciled”.276  
The aggravating factor in this case appears to be hidden exactly in the practice of IIAs. 
The so far prevailing treaty practice was based on including considerably “open” provisions 
regarding expropriation thus causing that the investors started to extend the application of the 
concept of indirect expropriation to almost any regulatory act (even omissions) that had an 
impact on their investment.277 
Thereofe, one of the questions that has lately arisen is whether the network of IIAs is not 
in fact detrimental for the state’s right to regulate.278 As a matter of fact, the debate that has 
appeared concerns the broader impact of IIAs on government regulations and changes to the 
laws.279 Followingly, many scholars have also expressed their concerns as regards the so called 
“regulatory chill” which basically encompasses the states’ reluctance to adopt laws due to the 
prospective claims which can be brought before the international tribunals.280 According to the 
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Feldman tribunal the states would not be able to achieve any legitimate and reasonable 
regulations if any business that is adversely affected could seek compensation.281 
As has been shown so far, there are many questions and interests involved concerning the 
matter. Nonetheless, it seems that the relationship between the state’s right to regulate and 
indirect expropriation in international investment law boils down to several essential issues 
which ought to be addressed. Firstly, has the state’s right to regulate as a concept of customary 
law any capability of being recognized within the network of IIAs? Secondly, how should then 
be addressed the emerged dichotomy between different state’s acts, i.e. between regulatory and 
expropriatory measures? Alternatively, where should the threshold delineating those measures 
reside? Thirdly, would the implementation of such a threshold mean that the measures 
considered regulatory were non-compensable? 
2.1 Treaty vs. customary law 
The previous Chapters have described the state’s right to regulate as a concept of 
customary law while indirect expropriation, being the concept emerging from the law of IIAs, 
could be seen as a treaty norm. Given this, it is absolutely essential to initially deal with the 
question whether the network of IIAs does not preclude the application of a norm of customary 
law such as the right to regulate. More specifically, whether the right to regulate as a concept 
rooted in the state’s sovereignty (and thus in international customary law) could be, as a matter 
of fact, inferior to the network of IIAs.282  
Primarily, it is necessary to establish whether the regime of such a network falls within 
general international law. 
The point is, that the complex of IIAs is sometimes deemed to have created a “self-
contained” system establishing itself a specialized regime outside general international law.283 
Many scholars, however, hold the opposite view. As was concluded for example by Newcombe 
& Paradell “IIAs are not regarded as self-contained with the risks of fragmentation in 
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international law, but rather systemically integrated within the international legal system”.284 
Nevertheless, even if the network of IIAs created a “self-contained” system this term should 
neither be used to “circumscribe the hypothesis of a fully autonomous legal subsystem” nor 
should it be read in a “clinical isolation from general international law”.285 
The rationale behind this statement is that the law of IIAs cannot be considered as an 
isolated system that would abide by its own logic and rules as the interpretation as well as 
application of IIAs is not independent from the overall features of general international law.286 
In fact, according to prof. McLachlan customary international law does intersect with the law 
of IIAs for instance by “shedding light on the meaning of the terms used by the treaty, 
stipulating rules or maxims of interpretation, delimiting the bounds of the state’s responsibility 
and giving content to the international minimum standard of treatment”.287 
As affiliation and interconnection of the IIAs’ network to general international law has 
been established, it is necessary to clarify whether the concept of the right to regulate could be 
indeed inferior to the network of IIAs. 
In fact, there is more into this issue than meets the eye as the exact relationship between 
the treaty practice in international investment law and the concept of sovereignty as the 
customary law is not fully and clearly resolved.288 
Primarily, it would be convenient to mention Article 38(2) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice which lays down the sources of international law.289 Many 
scholars have sided with the opinion that the ordering of the aforementioned sources implies 
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their hierarchical relationships; however, the general understanding seems to be that such an 
ordering merely reflects the logical sequence in which the rules would occur to the judge’s 
mind.290 Hence, according to Gazzini, the relationship between IIAs and the custom is rather 
one of the lex specialis and lex generalis.291  
Thus, from the fact that the treaty and customary rules are not hierarchically organized it 
follows, that the right of the state to regulate is a concept that by no means can be discarded by 
IIAs as treaty law.292 Nevertheless, as the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali implies, 
IIAs being international treaties embody certain limiting element that complements and 
streamlines the said right, for they place the right to regulate in a specific context where it is 
necessary to ensure the prudent and legitimate use thereof, given the proprietary rights of 
investors. 
Accordingly, as discussed above regarding the issue of the sovereignty of states, there 
cannot be seen any deprivation of sovereignty in the conclusion of IIAs, but rather a certain 
limitation of thereof. 
This leads to the conclusion that states are still entitled to regulate their internal affairs, 
however, those measures must not exceed a certain degree of intervention with the investors’ 
rights, since if they do so the state will bear responsibility for the breach of the IIA in question 
regardless of whether those measures were adopted in some praiseworthy objective.293 
Otherwise, the investors’ protection under IIAs would be essentially debased.  
That being said, as the tribunal in ADC observed, when the state enters in any international 
agreement it concurrently undertakes to comply with and fulfil all the obligations stemming 
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from the said agreement; it cannot later waive those obligations by simply referring to its right 
to adopt regulations.294 
2.2 Regulatory vs. Expropriatory measures 
Following the foregoing, if considered that the existence of the right to regulate is mostly 
acknowledged within international investment law, the crux of the matter would then rest in the 
extent of the lawful exercise thereof.295  
When in the exercise of their right to regulate the states adopt miscellaneous laws, 
directives and other measures (relating to many aspects of their existence encompassing 
taxation, health case, labour and trade law, environmental protection, and many others), it 
always somehow affects the day-to-day business of all the entities (including foreign investors) 
residing in the territories of these states.296 However, the degree of such an impact hugely varies 
– from a mere aggravation of the investor’s operation of its business to a straightforward 
annihilation thereof. Which in a consequence results in a dichotomy of the state’s measures – 
expropriatory and regulatory. 297 
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Consequently, the tribunals are brought before the question on how to differentiate 
expropriatory measures of a state, i.e. indirect expropriation, and regulatory measures, i.e. a 
legitimate exercise of a state’s right to regulate.  
As was pointed out by the Tecmed tribunal, it is crucial for the investment arbitrators when 
deciding the cases of indirect expropriation 
“to distinguish […] between a regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of 
the exercise of the state’s police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a 
de facto expropriation that deprives those assets and rights of any real substance.”298  
Otherwise, if all the state’s measures were deemed regulatory, i.e. falling under the right 
to regulate, investors would not be able to retrieve any compensation for the prospective indirect 
expropriation which would create a gaping loophole in international investment protection.299 
On the other hand, the distinction of legitimate regulatory measures from expropriation  
“screens out most potential [disputes] concerning economic intervention by a state and 
reduces the risk that governments will be subject to claims as they go about their business 
of managing public affairs”.300 
Generally, the definitions have concerned the expropriatory measures to be unduly or 
unreasonably depriving of investors’ proprietary rights, while non-compensable regulations 
were deemed legitimate exercise of the right to regulate of a lesser interference with the 
investor’s ownership.301  
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Additionally, expropriatory measures would usually aim at deprivation of an investor and 
lead to a corresponding enrichment of the public authority, even though the intention to 
expropriate and the corresponding enrichment are not requisite elements of indirect 
expropriation.302 
On the contrary, non-discriminatory measures, for a public purpose, taken in conformity 
with due process and in a good faith are deemed to be regulatory. According to Brownlie’s 
principles the legitimate exercise of the right to regulate encompasses mainly: “taxation, trade 
restrictions involving licenses and quotas, or measures of devaluation, [including the cases 
where]the state gives a public enterprise special advantages.”303 Regular exercise of the state’s 
criminal jurisdiction would also primarily fall under regulatory activity which does not amount 
to expropriation.304 
But what precisely does the word “legitimate exercise” imply?  
The jurisprudence of investment tribunals does not yet provide a clear guidance on what 
exactly is a legitimate exercise of the state’s regulatory activity.305 In fact, the precise elements 
of the legitimate exercise of the state’s right to regulate are yet to be identified by the means of 
the investment dispute resolution.306 However, the tribunals have already provided with certain 
guidelines on how the legitimacy of the state’s regulatory activity shall be assessed.307 In 
general, in order to be a legitimate measure, a relation between such measure and the pursued 
objective has to be found. Some of the tribunals even suggest that not only the measure has to 
be capable of reaching the objective, but it also must be the least harsh possible.308 Moreover, 
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the notion of legitimacy would be usually fulfilled in the cases of regulations in preservation of 
public health, environment, in the criminal law and taxation measures.309 
Nevertheless, the question regarding what precisely counts as a legitimate and bona fide 
regulation which would justify a deprivation of investor’s property remains rather thorny.310 
2.3 Right to regulate vs. the duty to compensate 
Getting to the crux of the matter, we gravitate back to the question put forth in the 
beginning of this Chapter. 
Naturally, the main issue concerning the state’s right to regulate within the ambit of 
international investment law is the question of compensation in cases where no appropriation 
is involved but the investment is aggrieved by the state’s regulatory activity.311 More 
specifically, the problem lies with a way of approaching adverse impacts such regulatory 
activity might have on the investments protected under IIAs and, most of all, an exemption of 
the host state from the duty to pay.312 
Generally speaking, in international law the states have in principle right of taking of any 
property.313 However, as mentioned before, the possibility to lawfully take over the (foreign) 
property is not unlimited as states can only do so in a non-discriminatory way, for a public 
purpose, in accordance with due process of law, and on payment of prompt and adequate 
compensation314. The requirement of an adequate compensation is usually referred to as Hull 
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formula.315 However, in cases when the concept of the state’s right to regulate is taken into 
consideration, the application of the Hull formula is considered to be contradicted thereby.316 
According to prof. Newcombe this matter is more about the allocation of risks between 
the states and investors.317 On one hand, it is not reasonable to require the investor the bare the 
cost of the necessary society-wide regulations; on the other, the states cannot be required to buy 
back each and every regulatory measure they adopt. The states simply would not be able to 
carry on with their activity “if to some extent […] property could not be diminished without 
paying for every […] change in the general law.”318  
On that account, Dr. Titi concluded that the right to regulate denotes “the legal right 
exceptionally permitting the host state to regulate in derogation of international commitments 
it has undertaken by means of an investment agreement without incurring a duty to 
compensate”.319 
A considerable number of scholars and tribunals have also repeatedly established that “no 
right to compensate arises for reasonably necessary regulations passed for the protection of 
public health, safety, morals or welfare”.320 One for all, the tribunal in Saluka concluded that  
“it is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay compensation 
to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt 
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Hence, although the state’s regulatory measures adopted in order to preserve public 
welfare, order or safety can often be experienced as detrimental, and hence mistaken for an 
indirect expropriation by the affected investors, those measures will typically not give rise to 
compensation.322 However, these measures have to fulfil the aforediscussed requirement of 
legitimacy in order to amount to “regulator expropriation” which does not trigger the duty to 
compensate as does indirect expropriation.323 
For the sake of completeness, it is important to mention that, for example, the tribunal in 
Santa Elena case dismissed the notion of non-compensatory regulations stating that  
“While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking 
for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was taken for 
this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be 
paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the 
Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate 
compensation must be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the 
environment makes no difference.” 
The same stance was adopted with regard to the taxation measure in Burlington and to the 
licence measure in Tecmed where measures normally falling under the legitimate right to 
regulate, and therefore excluded from the ambit of expropriation, nevertheless were found to 
not exempt the states from their duty to compensate.324 
Consequently, it follows that in cases where the state adopts a regulation in pursuance of 
its legitimate policy it would more often than not be exempted from the duty to compensate the 
aggrieved investor. However, the consideration must be given to the gravity of an impact the 
measure has on the said investor’s business. 
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3. FINDING THE LINE BETWEEN REGULATORY AND EXPROPRIATORY 
Not only the doctrine based on the dichotomy of the state’s measures that appeared 
because of recognition of the non-compensable (regulatory) and compensable (expropriatory) 
measures had necessitated certain progress regarding the delineation thereof. Over the last few 
decades, the investment tribunals have encountered quite a number of cases where the conflict 
between regulatory deeds of a state and the concept of indirect expropriation had to be dealt 
with.325 
Unlike the cases of direct expropriation mentioned in the Section 1.1 et seq. of the Part 
“Expropriation”, states would usually refuse to acknowledge the expropriatory nature of the 
adopted measures and would not offer compensation to the aggrieved investor trying to justify 
its deeds by the concept of the state’s right to regulate.326 Thus, the only option left for the 
injured investor is to seek protection under the IIA in question and bring a claim before an 
international investment tribunal. 
Hence, same as doctrine, the practice of the investment tribunals is in a disarray as regards 
establishing the line between legitimate regulatory measures and forms of indirect or creeping 
expropriation.327 The reason why neither the doctrine nor the ISDS practice has yet been able 
to satisfactorily resolve this matter is simple – the issue is very complex with many variables 
to take into consideration when searching for the compromise between public and private rights 
and interests. Moreover, it is necessary to take into account the social and political context of 
the respective measures when determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred.328 
Therefore, there still has not been elaborated any mechanical formula or test that would 
fit every case where the tribunal must find whether the adopted state measures have breached 
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the dividing line between legitimate and expropriatory.329 Additionally, due to the fact that the 
cases usually cover many different backgrounds and issues relating to the expropriation claim, 
the decision-making process usually necessitates a well elaborated case-by-case approach. As 
was also pointed out by the tribunal in the Feldman case, every dispute based on the alleged 
indirect expropriation has to be assessed in light of all the circumstances.330  
In consequence, the determination of each and every challenged measure falls to the 
adjudicator which has to decide whether such measure was legitimate or whether the state has 
crossed the line.331 
Finally, it bears mentioning that this deliberation is more necessary in cases where the 
state’s right to regulate is recognized. Where the tribunals applied the effects test, purpose and 
nature of measures forfeited its relevance. 
In the following, this Chapter will address the three main approaches of the investment 
tribunals to the establishment of cases of indirect expropriation and the relationship thereof 
towards the concept of the right to regulate. 
These approaches can be described as an effect approach, an except approach and a 
balance approach.332 The first two mentioned are represented by the sole effects doctrine and 
the police powers doctrine which are usually described as two leading tests applied by the 
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investment tribunals in the cases of indirect takings. Lastly, the third approach is considerably 
novel in the international investment jurisprudence; often referred to as the proportionality test.  
3.1 Sole effects doctrine 
The tribunals and scholars commonly concluded that impact of adopted measures has to 
fulfil certain degree of gravity in order to be perceived as expropriatory. Followingly, in ISDS 
practice severity of such impact or interference with investor’s property became a cardinal 
aspect in the assessment of state’s measures through the prism of indirect expropriation.333 
Some of the arbitrators, however, did not go past this criterion basing the assessment of state’s 
measures solely on the effect thereof on investor’s property.334 This approach is commonly 
referred to as the “sole effects doctrine”. 
The concept of the sole effects doctrine is deemed to stem from the practice of the Iran-
US Claims Tribunal. 335 It is important to emphasize that this doctrine is merely a construct of 
scholarly writings and practice of the investment tribunals and not a norm of customary law 
even though, for example, the tribunal in Metalclad came to this conclusion.336 
The sole effects doctrine approach focuses solely on the particular effect a regulation or a 
measure has on investor’s proprietary rights making it the sole determinative criterion.337 The 
purpose for adoption of regulatory measures is of no significance making the differentiation 
between legitimate and expropriatory regulations redundant as, in the end, all actions with 
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certain degree of impact would inevitably amount to indirect expropriation.338 Therefore, unlike 
the police powers doctrine which is based on finding of non-violation of the expropriation 
standard, the sole effect doctrine seeks indications of violation.339 
Given the fact that plentiful awards based on the sole effects doctrine were delivered by 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, it bears noting conclusion of some of the most iconic ones; yet it 
is necessary to reiterate beforehand that the application of this tribunal’s decisions in the ambit 
of investment cases has its limits.340 
Both the Tippetts and the Starrett Housing case strongly sided with the sole effects 
doctrine.341 These cases coincidently referred to the effect of measures adopted by state and 
held that when the effect is severe enough (i.e. the investor is virtually ripped off of all of its 
ownership components) no regard should be given to intent of a state to expropriate.  
One of the most illustrative cases where the investment tribunal applied the sole effects 
doctrine is a NAFTA case Metalclad. In this case a company Metalclad obtained a permit to 
build and operate a hazardous waste landfill in Mexico. Metalclad alleged Mexican government 
from (i) adopting measures which eventually virtually prevented the company from operating 
its facility and (ii) adopting the Ecological Decree creating an ecological preserve at the place 
of a landfill which had an effect of barring the operation thereof.342  
The Metalclad tribunal dealt with issues of expropriation in a rather brief and simplified 
way. It found that the measures effectively and unlawfully led to prevention from operating the 
landfill by Metalclad, and thus, amounted to indirect expropriation.343 The tribunal 
categorically refused to take Mexican government’s intentions into consideration expressly 
stating that “the [Ecological] Decree had the effect of barring forever the operation of the 
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landfill” which serves as a ground for finding an expropriation and therefore the tribunal “[does 
not need to] decide or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the Ecological 
Decree.”344 Interestingly, besides the case of Biloune which the tribunal considered as a 
persuasive authority, no other authorities or sources in support of the above cited conclusions 
were referred to.345 
Among the cases siding with the sole effects doctrine can be also listed Santa Elena 
case.346 Although in this case the tribunal acknowledged the existence of a legitimate exercise 
of the state’s regulatory powers for a public purpose, it also concluded that this could not 
exempt the state from its liability to compensate if such a regulation has an effect of taking.347 
Additionally, it is necessary to stress that in this particular case both parties agreed on the fact 
that expropriation took place and therefore, the tribunal did not have to elaborate excessively 
on this matter.348 Nevertheless, this tribunal by all means chose a very strict interpretation of 
investment law as teleologically oriented towards the protection of proprietary rights.349  
Similarly was concluded by the tribunal in Patrick Mitchell Annulment which stated that 
the fact that the arbitral tribunal which issued the award “focused solely on the impact that the 
measure had on the ‘investment’ corresponds to the application of the tantamount principle 
which is consistent with the spirit of investment treaties, namely the protection of investors.”350 
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The annulment tribunal substantiated its conclusions by referring to the 1992 Directives 
of the World Bank and, most of all, the Metalclad decision, stating that referring solely to the 
effects of the measures on the aggrieved investor regardless the purpose thereof “appears to be 
a practice of arbitrators – at present a majority of them – in international investment disputes 
when they are assessing the tantamount character [to expropriation].”351 
Additionally, for example in El Paso was also applied the “effect” approach on the 
grounds of which the tribunal refused to hold the occurrence of expropriation due to the lack of 
interference with El Paso’s property.352 
Interestingly, the Telenor tribunal has expressly acknowledged the existence of the police 
powers doctrine; nevertheless, it then proceeded with application of the sole effects doctrine.353 
Lastly, it bears mentioning Tecmed; a significant case supporting the line weighting solely 
the effect of state’s measure while deciding on occurrence of indirect expropriation. In this case 
the tribunal dealt with non-renewal of licences which were requisite for the investor’s operation 
of its business – a landfill of hazardous waste.354 
The reasoning of the Tecmed tribunal is germane for two reasons. Firstly, even though this 
tribunal has resorted to application of the sole effects doctrine, it has also deliberated on the 
application of the proportionality test, which makes it the first tribunal to employ the such test 
in the frames of investment arbitration.355 Secondly, this tribunal has also acknowledged that 
the police powers doctrine exists and that measures falling therein do not have to be 
compensated. However, it also added, that this applies solely within the ambit of domestic laws 
and cannot be employed by an international tribunal.356  
Some of the scholars have supported this doctrine considering it as the only logical 
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The reason for such a view resides primarily in the argument that the regulatory measures 
falling squarely into the exercise of the state’s right to regulate have to comprise solely of 
measures that do not exorbitantly interfere with foreign investment or deprive investors of their 
proprietary rights.357 Additionally, a high threshold which state’s measures have to reach in 
order to be deemed expropriatory is considered sufficient to also protect state’s regulatory 
interests. According to Mostafa the threshold under the sole effects doctrine requires a “very 
high level of interference with property” which means that majority of regulations would be 
unable to amount to expropriation.358  
Assessing the foregoing, on one hand, the argumentation for the use of the sole effects 
doctrine is quite persuasive and fairly understandable. The sole effects doctrine is essentially 
based on the assumption that the lawful expropriation can occur only if the measure is non-
discriminatory, adopted in accordance with due process in public interest, and adequately 
compensated. Which means that any measure the effect of which amounts to expropriation 
would become unlawful if one of the foregoing conditions was not met. The problem is that not 
only this approach is too formal and mechanical, but it is also fairly outdated in relation to more 
recent (speaking about the timeframe of last twenty years) wordings of the expropriation clauses 
incorporated in IIAs (even without reservations or GECs).359 
Thus, several scholars sided with the opposite view which criticizes insufficiency of a sole 
effects doctrine approach.360 One of the main problems is the questionable origin of this 
doctrine which itself is far from flawless.361 In fact, the “operation” of the Iran US Claims 
Tribunal is based on a very different set of rules which impose divergent criteria for 
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expropriatory measures.362 Moreover, such a one-sided approach leaves no space for 
recalibration of the competing rights which is needed in the economy of the current world which 
is highly concerned with environmental impacts of the industry. 
Another drawback of the sole effects doctrine is lurking in its very core – this doctrine 
requires exclusively certain effect inflicted by the adopted measures on the investment. 
However, as also follows from the previous Part of this thesis, it is very difficult to establish 
the line which would demarcate the perfect “amount” of severity of the impact which would 
always amount to expropriation.363 
Hence, even though some of the scholars strongly side with and support this doctrine, it 
still “remains a highly controversial approach to indirect expropriation”.364 According to prof. 
Herdegen, the controversies currently lie with the dilemma “whether qualification of an action 
as indirect expropriation or measure tantamount to expropriation should only consider the 
adverse effect of a State measure on the investment (‘sole effects doctrine’) or also the aim 
and interests pursued by the host State.”365 
Finally, the sole effects doctrine has without any doubt been so far leading approach to 
assessment of indirect expropriation cases. Nevertheless, in consideration of inherent flaws that 
coalesce this doctrine the investment tribunals started to shift to the scrutiny of the challenged 
measures under the doctrine of police powers.366 
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3.2 Police powers doctrine 
There is a considerably significant number of awards where the tribunals recognized the 
existence of the state’s right to regulate as a norm under which the state is not responsible for 
the negative economic effects its regulatory activities have on the investors’ proprietary 
rights.367 This body of case law implies that not only the effect of the measure but also its 
purpose is a substantial factor when assessing the cases of prospective indirect expropriation.  
As regards the roots of the police powers doctrine, it stems from the US constitutional law 
where it was firstly introduced in the case Brown v. Maryland.368 It was then fairly frequently 
applied within the arbitral practice of the investment tribunals. Notwithstanding, neither this 
doctrine has been so far applied unequivocally and uniformly by the investment tribunals, 
leaving us with several unresolved issues connected thereto.  
In the present day, according to prof. Viñuales the police powers doctrine “exists as a 
matter of customary international law” while its “actionable character [is deemed] an 
expression of sovereignty”.369 Hence, the notion of the police powers doctrine represents “an 
attempt by investment tribunals to reconcile the sovereign right of the State, as the guardian of 
the general public interest, to regulate economic activities on its territory with its treaty or 
contractual obligations.”370 
Followingly, unlike the sole effects doctrine, this approach to the assessment of the state’s 
activity in the cases of the alleged indirect expropriation, which is referred to as the police 
powers doctrine, is not limited by the one-dimensional point of view, i.e. the sight of the effect 
of the measure. On the contrary, the police powers doctrine not only acknowledges the existence 
of the state’s inherent right to regulate its internal matters, but also adds this “variable” into the 
equation of indirect expropriation case assessment.  
 
 
367 Ibid.; for example, Feldman, Saluka, Methanex, etc. 
368 LEGGARE, Santiago. The Historical Background Of The Police Power. Journal of Constitutional Law. 2002, 
9(3), 745-796. P. 747. 
369 DOUGLAS, Zachary, PAUWELYN, Joost, and VIÑUALES, Jorge E. The Foundations of International 
Investment Law: Bringing Theory Into Practice. Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2014. P. 329.  
370 PELLET, Alain. Chapter 32: Police Powers or the State's Right to Regulate. In: BIDEGAIN Mairée Uran, 
KINNEAR, Meg N., TORRES, Luisa Fernanda., FISCHER, Geraldine R. and ALMEIDA Jara Mínguez. Building 
international investment law: the first 50 years of ICSID. Alphen aan den Rijn : Wolters Kluwer, 2016.  P. 447. 
74 
 
The logic behind this approach is very well traceable. Primarily, the investor simply 
cannot rely on the stillness and eternal unchangeability of the host state’s legal framework or 
that its activity will not be subjected to the host state’s regulations.371 Hence, not all of the 
economic difficulties the investor would experience due to the regulatory changes should be 
treated as indirect expropriation.372 The latter was concluded for example by the tribunal in the 
NAFTA case Feldman which, following the decision in Azurix373 case, stated that:  
“not all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or impossible for an 
investor to carry out a particular business, change in the law or change in the application 
of existing laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a particular business, is an 
expropriation under Article 1110. Governments, in their exercise of regulatory power, 
frequently change their laws and regulations in response to changing economic 
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circumstances or changing political, economic or social considerations. Those changes 
may well make certain activities less profitable or even uneconomic to continue.”374 
It is also worth mentioning the tribunal’s view in an ICSID case Tecmed which 
acknowledged the fact that  
“[t]he principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers within the framework of 
its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its powers as 
administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is 
undisputable.”375  
However, as referred to earlier, in this particular case the tribunal subsumed the 
assessment of the reasons for particular legislative acts or the state’s police powers under the 
framework of the domestic law stating that it had no foundation to “review the grounds or 
motives of the [legal act] in order to determine whether it could be or was legally issued.”376  
Considering the application of the police powers doctrine within the arbitral practice, the 
very scope thereof was interpreted in two ways – broader and narrower. As a matter of fact, it 
is commonly acknowledged that there is a certain magnitude within the application of the police 
powers doctrine in the practice of investment tribunals.377  
Thus, based on the significance the tribunal gives to the purpose of the state’s measures, 
two variations of the police powers doctrine can be noticed; the radical or stringent and the 
moderate or mitigated approach.378 
Rather stringent was the decision in the Saluka case where Saluka asserted that it was 
deprived of its investment due to the reorganization and privatization of the Czech banking 
sector.379 The tribunal first recognized the state’s power to regulate by observing that  
 
 
374 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (also known as Marvin 
Feldman v. Mexico), Award, 16 December 2002, para. 112. 
375 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 
Award, 29 May 2003, para 119. 
376 Ibid., paras. 119 – 120. 
377 LEONHARDSEN, Erlend M. Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration. SSRN Electronic Journal. 2011. P. 30. 
378 BÜCHELER, Gebhard. Proportionality in investor-state arbitration. 1st ed. Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford 
University Press, 2015. P. 128-129; Ibid. 
379 Saluka Investments B.V. v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para. 1, 26. 
76 
 
“[i]t is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay compensation 
to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt 
in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulation that are aimed at the general 
welfare.” 
Followingly, upon the assessment of all the facts of the case, the tribunal acknowledged 
that the Czech Republic’s measures of imposing the forced administration of Saluka indeed 
“had the effect of eviscerating Saluka’s investment.”380 Notwithstanding, the tribunal held that 
“the Claimant has failed to establish a deprivation of sufficient magnitude to form the basis of 
an expropriation claim.”381 
A similar conclusion was reached by the tribunal in the Methanex case. The Methanex 
tribunal, as did the tribunal in the Metalclad case, has dealt with the connotation of the meaning 
and scope of measures “tantamount to” expropriation while it has also addressed the question 
whether regulatory measures that have a significant impact on the investor’s business are 
covered by the concept of indirect expropriations.382 Contrary to the Metalclad case, however, 
this tribunal sided with the police powers doctrine concluding that:  
“as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public 
purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, 
a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless 
specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then putative 
foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain from such 
regulation.”383 
Lastly, another decision which is known for its very radical conclusions regarding 
application of the police powers doctrine was issues by the Chemtura tribunal. 384 
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In this case, the claim has arisen from the fact that Canada has taken several steps 
throughout the years to restrict the use of lindane, an agricultural pesticide.385 The Claimant, a 
firm manufacturing lindane, challenged these measures asserting that its investment was 
deprived by them and thus expropriated. 
The tribunal applied the police powers doctrine in its full terms and held that:  
“Even if the Tribunal concluded that there was a substantial deprivation of the Claimant's 
investment, there was still no expropriation because the PMRA's decision to phase out all 
agricultural applications of lindane was a valid exercise of Canada's police powers to 
protect public health and the environment. The decision of the PMRA to de-register 
lindane meets the test of this doctrine because (i) it was not made in an arbitrary manner 
since it respected due process and was based on valid science; (ii) it was non-
discriminatory; (iii) it was not excessive; and (iv) it was made in good faith to combat 
the serious occupational exposure risks posed by lindane.”386 
The tribunal also further explained that adoption of the said measures was “motivated by 
the increasing awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for human health and the 
environment [and that a] measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid exercise 
of the State's police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an expropriation.”387 
Following these decisions, no wonder that such an application of the police powers 
doctrine has also earned its deal of criticism.388 As a matter of fact, a strong reliance on the 
purpose of the state’s measures could have the effect of excluding all the regulatory measures 
of the state from the concept of indirect expropriation leaving it emptied.389 The rule of a thumb 
is, that measures in order to be legitimate exercise of the state’s right to regulate, most of all, 
have to be in the public purpose. However, the tribunals have little to no discretion in this 
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context as in the current “state of customary international law [and] in the field of foreign 
investment, is that states are free to determine what is in their public interest”.390  
Hence, the investment tribunals started to opt for a more balanced approach when 
assessing the state’s right to regulate its internal matters which lead to the formation of the 
moderate approach.391 Under this approach the tribunals are more drawn to distinguish the 
regulatory and expropriatory measures of the state. 
In this context, the Feldman case tribunal upheld the state’s right to regulate upon 
assessing application of certain tax laws by Mexico to the export of tobacco products by the 
Claimant.392 The tribunal stressed the necessity of the state’s freedom to regulate in a broader 
public interest in pursuance of the protection of the environment and other similarly important 
objectives.393 However, it also dismissed the argumentation of Mexico, the Respondent, that 
any measure adopted in public purpose will not amount to expropriation. Concerning this, the 
tribunal held that “no one can seriously question that in some circumstances government 
regulatory activity can be a violation of Article 1110 (expropriation)” and that, referring to the 
Pope & Talbot decision “regulations can indeed be characterized in a way that would constitute 
creeping expropriation.”394 
It is important to reiterate that the tax measures are usually more easily recognized as a 
legitimate activity of a state and thus, in order for this activity to be deemed expropriatory, the 
investment would have to be virtually annihilated with the traceable discriminatory intent of 
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the state. hence, in recognition of the state’s right to regulate the tribunal has concluded that the 
“state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from 
bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind that is 
commonly accepted as within the police power of states, if it is not discriminatory[…].” 
Lastly, the tribunal in El Paso has also sided with the police powers doctrine.395 
Nevertheless, it also has expressly voiced the need for reasonableness and proportionality in 
the application of the police powers doctrine.396  
Followingly, it seems that the practice of the investment tribunals has slightly been 
shifting towards a more balanced approach even though this doctrine is still not flawless.397 In 
fact, as was mentioned by prof. Lowe, such a development is not a mere “accidental result” of 
the investment tribunals’ creativity in their decision-making process, but rather “an essential 
element of the permanent sovereignty of each State over its economy.”398 
3.3 The proportionality test 
Though the police powers doctrine might seem as a perfectly functional solution, there are 
still some issues leading the tribunals and scholars to further seek a more nuanced approach to 
the matter.399 As was fittingly observed by the tribunal in Pope & Talbot, relying solely on the 
police powers doctrine would provide for “[a] blanket exception for regulatory measures 
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[which] would create a gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation.”400 
Strictly speaking, blind application of the police powers doctrine would provide a cart blanche 
for any of the host state’s regulations which would render the investors’ protection virtually 
useless. 
One of the possible ways to resolve some of the police powers doctrine’s drawbacks is to 
apply the proportionality test. This test has been introduced in the practice of international 
investment tribunals rather recently and its applicability within the ISDS practice has not been 
fully determined yet.401 Some of the scholars see the proportionality test as a complementary 
tool to be used jointly with the police powers doctrine or any other doctrine.402 Others assume 
that the proportionality test shall be used independently regardless recognition of any other 
doctrine concerning the matter.403 Due to the fact that the practice of the investment tribunals 
is far from uniform, some of the scholars even suggest that arbitral tribunals should employ the 
proportionality test (or similar method of balancing) when resolving the cases of indirect 
expropriation rather than the doctrines described above.404 
In any case, the proportionality test provides with another criteria on the basis of which 
the tribunal can evaluate the state’s measures in question on the basis of validity while stricto 
sensu its main aim is to determine “whether there is a balance between the regulatory objective 
and the taking that is put into effect”.405 And thus to distinguish the measures falling under the 
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This test has been described as a threefold test which includes the assessment of suitability, 
necessity and proportionality stricto sensu of the state’s measures under scrutiny.407 
Additionally, there is also a preliminary assessment which focuses on the regulatory objective, 
meaning whether the measures serve the public purpose.408 
After the “public interest” is affirmed in the preliminary phase, the analysis of the three 
aforementioned elements follows. Hence, in order to be regarded as a non-compensable 
regulation the measure firstly, to be suitable to protect the interest for the protection of which it 
has been adopted; secondly, the necessity of the measure requires that there must be no adequate 
less restrictive measure capable of attaining the objective pursued; lastly, the measure shall not 
be disproportionate, meaning that the restriction it causes must not be out of proportion to the 
intended objective or the result.409 
Being a newness within the ambit of international investment law, the concept of 
proportionality is not a novelty in the general jurisprudence for it has been already known for 
quite a long time to numerous jurisdictions in South America, Europe, as well as various 
common law countries as a mode of balancing between competing rights and interests.410 It is 
commonly reported that this test originated from German administrative and constitutional law 
and for the first time was referred to by the German Constitutional Court in Apothekenurteil,411 
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where it stated that “[t]he solution can only be found in each case by careful balancing of the 
importance of the opposing (and possibly actually conflicting) interests”.412 
As a method of balancing of the competing maxims or principles, the proportionality test 
is also deemed to be a concept strongly linked to human rights.413 Indeed, several for this matter 
germane cases were resolved before the ECHR  and were later referred to by the investment 
tribunals. 
One of the first cases where the ECHR resorted to application of the proportionality test 
is James and Others. This case dealt with the claimants’ challenge of the 1967 Leasehold 
Reform Act on the grounds of deprivation of their property rights as lessees were given an 
opportunity to purchase the freehold reversion.414 The ECHR came to conclusion that:  
“Not only must a measure depriving a person of his property pursue, on the facts as well 
as in principle, a legitimate aim "in the public interest", but there must also be a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised.”415 
The ECHR based these conclusions on the argumentation of the judgement in Sporrong 
and Lönnroth case where the concept of proportionality was expressed as a requirement of “fair 
balance” in a conflict of “general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”416 The court also concluded that such a “fair 
balance” would not be inferred in the situation where the aggrieved person would have to bear 
“an individual and excessive burden.”417 
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While addressing the actual measures adopted to pursue any socially important objective, 
the ECHR also added that “a measure must be both appropriate for achieving its aim and not 
disproportionate thereto.”418 
Similarly, the ECHR concluded in the case Mellacher and Others which dealt with 
restrictions imposed on the rent that a property owner could charge. Regarding the 
proportionality the ECHR concluded that “an interference must achieve a “fair balance” 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights”.419  
Lastly, as for the measures that could fail the proportionality test the ECHR in Matos e 
Silva observed that 
“the length of the proceedings, coupled with the fact that it had so far been impossible for 
the applicants to obtain even partial compensation for the damage sustained, upset the 
balance which should be struck between protection of the right of property and the 
requirements of the general interest.” 420 
Interestingly, until recently421 the proportionality test has nowise been included in IIAs as 
a criterion based on which the cases of regulatory takings would have to be assessed. On the 
contrary, the proportionality test made first its way into the ISDS practice through certain 
adventurism and creative interpretation of IIAs by arbitral tribunals.422  
The first (and only) investment tribunal to properly articulate the proportionality test as a 
method of distinguishing between compensable indirect expropriation and non-compensable 
regulatory measure was the Tecmed tribunal.423 In order to draw guidance for the use of the 
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proportionality analysis in determining whether a legitimate regulation turned in fact into 
indirect expropriation the tribunal relied on the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, 
especially the Matos e Silva case cited above and Pressos Compañía Naviera.424 The tribunal 
considered whether regulatory actions in question were “proportional to the public interest 
presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into 
account that the significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the 
proportionality”.425  
It then proceeded with the observation that “[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim 
sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.” 426 On the basis of such consideration the 
Tecmed tribunal found the non-renewal of the license as disproportionate and therefore it held 
that the Mexico’s measures constituted indirect expropriation.427 
Additionally, there were several cases that referred to the certain elements of the 
proportionality test even though they haven’t specifically applied it.  
The means of evaluation in the case S.D. Myers can be even seen as the forerunner of the 
proportionality test. Although the tribunal in this case focused primarily on the effect of the 
measures taking also into consideration the purpose thereof, it has also added an unuttered 
reference to the “necessity prong” of the proportionality test.428 Hence, it has observed that 
“where a state can achieve its chosen level of environmental protection through a variety of 
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equally effective and reasonable means, it is obliged to adopt the alternative that is most 
consistent with open trade.”429  
Finally, the few following investment tribunals dealing with the expropriation claims also 
partly resorted to requirements of the proportionality test. As a matter of fact, these tribunals 
have addressed the scrutinized measures from the perspective of the police powers doctrine, 
however, they also added the requirement of the proportionality stricto sensu into their 
deliberation. 
Thus, the tribunal in LG&E observed that the state has its power to regulate its policies, 
“except in cases where the State’s action is obviously disproportionate to the need being 
addressed.”430 Similarly, the tribunal in El Paso relying on the LG&E decision formulated the 
requirement of the “reasonableness and proportionality of State measures interfering with 
private property”.431 The tribunal in Total has come to the same conclusion.432  
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4. THE STATE’S RIGHT TO REGULATE IN THE TREATY PRACTICE  
It is safe to say that vast majority of IIAs has regularly and traditionally addressed indirect 
expropriation, however, especially older IIAs were often silent on regulatory measures in 
relation to indirect takings except for several treaties such as, for example, the US FTAs433, and 
the US and Canada Model BITs.434 
As a matter of fact, in principle, by concluding IIAs states are not supposed to be deemed 
discarding their right to regulate as it is an inherent part of their sovereignty which the states 
cannot be divested of.435 The regime of IIAs is merely limiting the states’ capacity to perform 
this component of their sovereignty.436 Notwithstanding, as the ISDS practice has shown, 
whether the state’s measures are assessed through the prism of the police powers doctrine, sole 
effects doctrine or the proportionality test is a matter of tribunal’s discretion and thus it is almost 
impossible to “pre-judge which measure will be deemed to constitute permissible non-
compensable state regulation and which not.”437 Thus, it also depends on the tribunals whether 
they would be willing to recognize the foregoing state’s right to regulate under IIAs or other 
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international instruments even where the treaty in question lacks a specific wording relating 
thereto.  
This can be illustrated for instance on the North Atlantic Fisheries case where the British 
argued that the right to regulate as one of the essential attributes of sovereignty “must be held 
to reside in the territorial sovereign, unless the contrary be provided” 438 despite the lack of 
support therefor in a respective treaty.439 The tribunal, however, did not agree with this 
contention.440 Similarly, the tribunal in Santa Elena refused to upheld the state’s right to 
regulate concerning legitimate environmental regulations without a specific reference thereto 
in the BIT the case was being settled under.441  
Furthermore, the existing treaty practice has predominantly developed a strong protection-
oriented approach giving the investors a wide range of grounds upon which the cases against 
the host states could be built.442 One for all, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) treaty has recently risen an upsurge of concerns about the erosion of the state’s sovereign 
right to regulate due to apprehension about potential disputes brought before international 
tribunals by the investors.443 Particularly as problematic was deemed the TTIP’s Article 7 which 
“[would give] foreign companies the right to sue national and regional governments for 
compensation, whenever their access to markets [would be] unfairly impeded by local 
legislation and whenever their ‘legitimate’ expectations [would be] frustrated.”444  
As has been partly implied above, some of the scholars even argue that this treaty practice 
could lead to a regulatory “freeze” especially as regards laws strengthening environmental 
 
 
438 The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v United States of America), PCA Case No. XI RIAA 
167, Award 7 September 1910, para. 180. 
439 RAJPUT, Aniruddha. Regulatory freedom and indirect expropriation in investment arbitration. Netherlands : 
Wolters Kluwer, 2019. P. 157. 
440 The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v United States of America), , PCA Case No. XI RIAA 
167, Award 7 September 1910, para. 182. 
441 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award, 
17 February 2000, para. 71 
442 PUPOLIZIO, Ivan. The Right to an Unchanging World. Indirect Expropriation in International Investment 
Agreements and State Sovereignty. SSRN Electronic Journal. 2015. P. 5. 
443 BALAŠ, Vladimír and ŠTURMA, Pavel. Nové mezinárodní dohody na ochranu investic. Praha : Wolters 
Kluwer, 2018, ISBN 978-80-7598-100-4. P. 39. 




protection.445 The host states’ reluctance to incorporate laws due to the fear of being forced to 
pay heavy compensations in the case of dispute settlement sought by the aggrieved investors is 
often referred to as the “regulatory chill”.446 The problem of “regulatory chill” has been 
subjected to a thorough discussion already by several scholars and arbitrators, calling for a more 
balanced approach towards the states’ and the investors’ rights within the ambit of ISDS.447 
Thus, not only the ISDS practice, but also the treaty practice is currently highly concerned 
with solving this Rubik’s cube of the relationship between the state’s right to regulate and 
indirect expropriation. Apparently, drafting a well-balanced treaty which could establish an 
equilibrium between the public and private rights of states and investors is almost an 
alchemy.448  
Treaty practice regarding states’ right to regulate is not a novelty introduced to the 
international law by IIAs. Contrarily, there are several legal instruments that have expressly 
recognized the existence of non-compensable regulations even long before the IIAs’ era. 
For instance, the state’s right to regulate its internal matters often appeared in the so-called 
friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties.449 Hence, the 1948 US-Italy FCN states 
that “[t]he provisions of this Treaty shall not be construed to affect existing laws and regulations 
of either High Contracting Party in relation to immigration or the right of either High 
Contracting Party to adopt and enforce laws and regulations relating to immigration.”450  
 
 
445 See, for example in BAETENS, Freya. Foreign Investment Law and Climate Change: Legal Conflicts Arising 
from Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Through Private Investment. The Center for International Sustainable 
Development Law  & The International Development Law Organization. 2010. P. 8 et seq; for further discussion, 
see MILES, Kate. International Investment Law and Climate Change: Issues in the Transition to a Low Carbon 
World. SSRN Electronic Journal. 2008.  
446 CRAWFORD, James. Chapter 27: The Kyoto Protocol in Investor-State Arbitration: Reconciling Climate 
Change and Investment Protection Objectives. In: SEGGER, Marie-Claire, GEHRING, Markus W. and 
NEWCOMBE, Andrew. Sustainable development in world investment law. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law 
International, 2011. ISBN 978-90-411-3166-9. Pp 696-697. 
447 SHEKHAR, Satwik. Regulatory Chill: Taking the Right to Regulate for a Spin. Indian Institute of Foreign 
Trade: Centre for WTO Studies. 2016, Working Paper CWS/WP/200/27. P. 13-15.  
448 According to Dr. Titi the dilemma stems from the fact that “drafting the clause in too general terms, [would 
mean] risking the loss of its effectiveness [and] drafting it too explicitly, enumerating its specific domains, [would 
mean] the risk consisting in the possible incompleteness of the enumeration”. 
TITI, Catharine. The right to regulate in international investment law. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2014. P. 172. 
449 Ibid., p. 54.  
450 US-Italy FCN (1948), Article XXIV(7). 
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Also, the 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to Aliens reads that “an uncompensated taking of property of an alien or a deprivation 
of the use or enjoyment of property of an alien which results from the execution of the tax laws; 
from a general change in the value of currency; from the action of the competent authorities of 
the State in the maintenance of public order, health, or morality; or from the valid exercise of 
belligerent rights; or is otherwise incidental to the normal operation of the laws of the State 
shall not be considered wrongful.”451 
Similarly, according to the commentary to the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States “a state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or 
other action [which is] within the police power of states […].”452  
Additionally, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,453 the preamble of the 
WTO’s GATS,454 and the European Convention on Human Rights455  
 
 
451 “Harvard draft convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens”, In: SOHN, 
Louis B. and BAXTER, R. R. Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens: II. Draft 
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens. The American Journal of 
International Law. 1961, 55(3), 548. Article 10(5). 
452“Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States”, § 712, comment g. In: ANON. 
Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The American Law Institute. Case 
Citations, Rules and Principles, Part VII, Chapter II - Injury to Nationals of Other States, Restat 3d of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the U.S., § 712.  
453 “each State has the right [t]o regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national 
jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and 
priorities.” 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN. Doc. A/RES/29/3281, 12 December 1974, GA Res. 3281 
(XXIX), 29 Sess. in its Article 2 
454 “recognizing the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services 
within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives and, given asymmetries existing with respect to 
the degree of development of services regulations in different countries, the particular need of developing countries 
to exercise this right.” 
General Agreement on Trade and Services, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183,33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994), Preamble. 
455 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Paris, 20.III.1952, 
Article 1, Protection of property; 
“The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it 
deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”. 
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As regards the international investment law, in the course of time and development of the 
language of IIAs, the states opted for inclusion of certain provisions therein that would codify 
and thus reaffirm their right to regulate in order to find a balance between public and private 
rights.456 Especially the new generation of IIAs started to include provisions emphasizing and 
affirming the state’s right to regulate.457 According to the OECD paper as of 2005 “an 
increasing number of agreements refer to the role of governments to pursue other policy 
goals.”458  
To set the record straight, treaty practice of IIAs with variable degrees has already 
recognized the state’s right to regulate.459 For example, the first BIT signed in 1959 between 
Pakistan and Germany referred to the state’s right to regulate in its protocol stated that 
“measures taken for reasons of public security and order, public health or morality shall not 
be deemed as discrimination within the meaning of Article 2”.460 Nevertheless, striving for more 
balanced IIAs, i.e. elaborating the equilibrium between the protection of foreign investors and 
state’s right to regulate (especially concerning indirect expropriation), is more of a recent 
phenomenon.  
As regards this practice the opinion thereon within the circle of arbitrators, scholars and 
other professionals in international investment law differs.  
According to some of the scholars such practice is utterly redundant for the right to 
regulate is a norm of a customary international law and as such shall be recognized without any 
specific treaty provision thereon. As was observed by Dr. Rajput such practice “is merely a 
reaffirmation of the right in customary law” further adding that “if it were argued that States 
could regulate only if they are so permitted or obliged due to other natural or international 
obligations, it would introduce artificial and impractical rigidity.”461 
 
 
456 BÜCHELER, Gebhard. Proportionality in investor-state arbitration. 1st ed. Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford 
University Press, 2015. P.122. 
457 BALAŠ, Vladimír and ŠTURMA, Pavel. Nové mezinárodní dohody na ochranu investic. Praha : Wolters 
Kluwer, 2018, ISBN 978-80-7598-100-4. P. 39. 
458 OECD. International investment perspectives: 2006 Edition. París : OECD. 2006. P. 176. 
459 TITI, Catharine. The right to regulate in international investment law. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2014. P. 53. 
460  Germany-Pakistan BIT (1959), Protocol (2). 
461 RAJPUT, Aniruddha. Regulatory freedom and indirect expropriation in investment arbitration. Netherlands : 
Wolters Kluwer, 2019. P. 113. 
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Indeed, this is an understandable argument, however, if that was the case then the 
prevailing practice of the investment tribunals in cases of indirect expropriation would be police 
powers doctrine (or a similar approach which applies the state’s right to regulate even without 
its express affirmation in the respective treaty). Nevertheless, as discussed before, this is not 
the case as the sole effects doctrine is still very popular among the tribunals which highly 
concerns the states as the outcome of the investment disputes is thus often unpredictable. 462 
Additionally, according to UNCTAD including such provisions is one of the key means of 
securing the state’s regulatory activity while protecting its flexibility under the network of 
IIAs.463 
Consequently, as regards the contemporary treaty practice, there are several different ways 
of incorporating and affirming the state’s regulatory power in IIAs.464  
First and foremost, the states started to include obligation-specific exclusions to the 
respective expropriation clauses. As the term itself indicates, these exceptions apply to the 
respective standards of protection included in IIAs; usually those are the non-discrimination 
provisions of national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment.465 These provisions 
would commonly appear either in the clause concerning expropriation or in the corresponding 
annexes which bring further definition to the notion of indirect expropriation.466 
 
 
462 MANN, Howard. Investment Agreements and the Regulatory State: Can Exception Clauses Create a Safe 
Heaven for Governments? Issues in International Investment Law, Background Papers for the Developing Country 
Investment Negotiators’ Forum. Singapore, 2007, 1-2. P.5. 
463 UNCTAD IIAs, p. 6. 
464 SOLOMOU, Alexia. Chapter 15: Exceptions to a Rule Must Be Narrowly Construed. In: KLINGLER, Josef. 
Between the lines of the Vienna Convention?:canons and other principles of interpretation in public international 
law. Alphen aan den Rijn : Wolters Kluwer, 2019. Pp. 359-386.  pp. 359 – 386. 
465 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 44. 
466 Ibid. 
For the treaty wordings see, for example, Austria-Tajikistan (2010) BIT, Article 7, Subsection 4; Canada- Moldova 
(2018) BIT, Annex 10.B, subsection C: 
“Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in the light of their 
purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith, non-
discriminatory measures of a Contracting Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.”  
Additionally, Colombia-Korea (2013) FTA, Article 5, Subsection 6: 
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The notion of the state’s right to regulate has also slowly started to appear in the preambles 
of the respective IIAs.467 To this day, there are however not that many IIAs that would recognize 
the state’s right to regulate within their preamble; out of all the 2577 IIAs mapped by UNCTAD 
only 45 have such a phasing.468  
Lastly, some of the IIAs contain wording only seemingly supportive of the state’s right to 
regulate but in fact are mere interpretive guidelines with no practical applicability.469 These will 
be in detail addressed further. 
These provisions, however, in no case shall be understood as permissible norms under 
which the states are allowed to regulate regardless any impact of the measures and their 
consequent liability therefor.  
Apart from the aforementioned clauses, affirming the state’s right to regulate, the treaty 
practice is also familiar with the general provisions that allow to exempt certain measures of 
states from IIAs’ regime or from the obligations imposed by IIA as a whole. The thesis follows 
with the discussion concerning such clauses. 
 
 
“This article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property 
rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual 
property rights.” 
467 MANN, Howard. Investment Agreements and the Regulatory State: Can Exception Clauses Create a Safe 
Heaven for Governments? Issues in International Investment Law, Background Papers for the Developing Country 
Investment Negotiators’ Forum. Singapore, 2007, 1-2. P. 7. 
468 Investmentpolicy.unctad.org. (2019). Mapping of IIA Content | International Investment Agreements Navigator 
| UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. [online] Available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/iia-mapping [Accessed 3 Dec. 2019]. 
For example, NAFTA preamble states “The Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States 
and the Government of the United States of America, resolved to: PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the 
public welfare;” 
Similarly, Algeria - Russian Federation BIT (2006);  
469 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of 
treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 509. 
See, for example, India - Korea, Republic of CEPA (2009), Article 10.16; Rwanda - United States of America BIT 
(2008), Article 12 subsection 2; NAFTA, Article 1114; 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any 
measure otherwise consistent with this Agreement that is in the public interest, such as measures to meet health, 




1. GENERAL EXCEPTIONS IN GENERAL 
While speaking about the state’s right to regulate and the ways of expressing it in the treaty 
practice it is important to elaborate on a considerably new phenomenon of the so-called general 
exceptions clauses (hereinafter also as the “GEC”).470 
Along with the obligation-specific exceptions and precise phrasing of the IIAs’ preambles, 
the GECs are perceived as additional and the most complex way of incorporating an express 
right to regulate in IIAs.471  
In principle, the GECs are intended to be applicable to the IIA in question as a whole.472 
The fundamental objective behind this is to exempt host states from liability for violating any 
of the standards of protection in IIAs when adopting regulations of society-wide importance, 
which purports to bring more balance between the goals of public policy and the investors’ 
protection.473 
Indeed, such clauses are primarily exploitable in the situations when it is necessary to 
achieve certain policy goals which are almost impossible to reach in nowadays market 
liberalization; in which context prof. Kurtz observed that “many older BITs classically oblige 
states to enable free transfer of capital associated with all covered investments and do not – in 
general – allow for the imposition of restrictions for balance-of-payments or other reasons.474  
 
 
470 For the purpose of this thesis, the notion General Exceptions Clauses is discussed in a stricto sensu connotation, 
meaning solely the genuine GECs mostly based on the WTO law and other similar clauses. The subsection 1.2, 
however, do provide certain insight on the exceptions and carve-outs in more general sense in order to show the 
differences therebetween.  
471 TITI, Catharine. The right to regulate in international investment law. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2014. P. 169. 
472 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 40. 
473 LÉVESQUE, Céline. The inclusion of GATT Article XX exceptions in IIAs: a potentially risky policy. In: 
ECHANDI, Roberto, SAUVÉ,Pierre. Prospects in International Investment Law and Policy: World Trade Forum. 
New York : Cambridge University Press Policy. 2013, pp. 363–370. P. 363. 




To illustrate the aforementioned, let us imagine the following situation.475 A developing 
state signs a mining contract with an investor. The contract concerns operation of one-of-a-kind 
mining pit specialized exclusively in exploitation of a rare earth metal. However, as activities 
of the investor go by, it becomes known that the by-product of the mining activity is a toxic 
waste which is highly detrimental to the environment of the state in question as well as health 
of its population. Hence, the state is constrained to prohibit operation of the mining pit. 
Being it under a standard IIA, the state would basically find itself in a situation when it 
would have to “buy” a possibility to protect health of its own citizens as well as the environment 
(that is under consideration that the respective tribunal deciding upon the case would rule out 
the application of police powers doctrine). Picturing it like this, no wonder the situation starts 
to acquire fairly risible colours. 
Followingly, the idea of incorporating GECS into IIAs was triggered by the latest 
developments in ISDS practice which, according to several scholars and arbitrators, started to 
seem to have a suppressing effect on the host states’ capacity to regulate.476  
By inclusion of GECs the states aspire to reach certain recalibration of the relationship 
between the protection of investors and pursuance of non-economic interests by the states.477 
The practice of incorporating such clauses into IIAs is, however, neither long existing nor 
widely employed. Contrarily, according to the UNCTAD IIAs Navigator, only 
approximately478 121 out of 2 571 BITs contain a general public policy clause or GEC.479 
Moreover, about ¾ of these IIAs were concluded only after the year 2000 with an increasing 
 
 
475ANON., 2019. Fdimoot.org [online] [Accessed. 1. November 2019]. Available at: 
https://www.fdimoot.org/Archive/2018/2018problem.pdf. 
476 See, for example, MITCHELL, Andrew D., MUNRO, James and VOON, Tania. Importing WTO General 
Exceptions into International Investment Agreements: Proportionality, Myths and Risks. Forthcoming, Yearbook 
of International Investment Law and Policy 2016-2017 ;U of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper. Oxford : 
Oxford University Press, 2018, No. 757.; KURTZ Jürgen. The WTO and international investment law. Cambridge 
: Cambridge University Press, 2016.; and TITI, Catharine. The right to regulate in international investment law. 
Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2014. 
477 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. ISBN 978-3-8452-9193-2. 
P. 25. 
478 The number is only indicative due to the possible flaws in the searching algorithm. 
479 Investmentpolicy.unctad.org. (2019). Mapping of IIA Content | International Investment Agreements Navigator 
| UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. [online] Available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/iia-mapping [Accessed 3 November 2019]. 
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tendency in the past 9 years.480 Consequently, to this date only about 5% of the IIAs (meaning 
primarily the BITs) contain such provisions, which is indeed very few. 
Similarly, as in the case of the concept of indirect expropriation and right to regulate, there 
are several issues regarding the matter which have not yet been resolved.  
Primarily, the novelty of this phenomenon constitutes one of the prominent issues 
connected thereto. More precisely, the problem is that the treaty practice is yet to become steady 
and uniform. As regards the aforementioned, there are still more IIAs that do not contain the 
GECs but rather other means of reinforcement of the state’s right to regulate (if any). Not to 
mention variances of the phrasing of the GECs among different IIAs. 
Further difficulty revolving around the incorporation of the GEC into IIAs is that there is 
no uniform opinion on whether those clauses are necessary in IIAs.481 In fact, according to prof. 
Newcomb there is no much area for the GECs to have a practical significance within the 
framework of international investment law. Accordingly, also the applicability of the GECs is 
problematic due to their origin, i.e. the law of WTO.482 
Lastly, neither there is a unanimous opinion regarding the relationship of the GECs and 
the other means of securing the state’s regulatory flexibility in IIAs (especially as regards the 
explanatory Annexes to the clauses on expropriation or obligation-specific clauses). 
1.1 What are general exceptions clauses?  
The states started to incorporate GECs into their IIAs with an increasing tendency in the 
past two decades. Those clauses were mostly either inspired by or directly “transplanted” from 
the WTO law into the respective investment treaties.483 Thus, vast majority of the GECs are 
 
 
480 Ibid.  
481 For example, according to Federico Ortino “there is no need to provide general exception provisions[…] as 
the prerogative to adopt measures to pursue legitimate public policies is inherent in the substantive guarantees 
based on non-discrimination and reasonableness.” 
ORTINO, Federico. Substantive Provisions in IIAs and Future Treaty-Making: Addressing Three Challenges. 
SSRN [online]. 27 June 2015. [Accessed 1 November 2019]. Available from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2623545. P. 4. 
482 Primarily, as for the fact that these bodies of law are governed by different bodies of rules and apply to very 
divergent set of relationships as is also discussed below. 
483 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 290. 
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either based on the Article XX GATT or Article XIV GATS.484 Some of the contemporary 
agreements, however, contain sui generis GECs.485  
As expressed above, unlike the obligation-specific clauses, the GECs are intended to 
exempt certain legitimate policy objectives from the application of the IIA in question as a 
whole. By the means of the GECs states strive to exempt measures “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, or for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, public 
morals,” and others.486  
The typical structure of the GEC contains three important parts – the so called “chapeau” 
which prevents the states from adopting discriminatory and arbitrary measures and introduces 
the exceptional nature of the public welfare objectives below; the list of legitimate public 
interest objectives (such as protection of the public order, health, environment, etc.); and the 
part which expresses the nexus requirement between the pursued objectives and the means 




484 BALAŠ, Vladimír and ŠTURMA, Pavel. Nové mezinárodní dohody na ochranu investic. Praha : Wolters 
Kluwer, 2018. P. 40. 
485 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 81 et seq. 
486 UNCTAD. World investment report 2010: investing in a low-carbon economy. United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World investment report. 22 July 2010. New York,: United Nations. P. 124. 
(hereinafter UNCTAD 2010) 
487 For illustration, a typically built GEC can be seen, for example, in Australia - China FTA (2015), Article 9.8 
which reads as follows: 
“1. For the purposes of this Chapter and subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between investments or between investors, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
a Party from adopting or enforcing measures: [being a chapeau] 
(a) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
(b) necessary to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with this Agreement;  
(c) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value; or - 90 –  
(d) relating to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.” 
[“necessary to” encompasses the nexus requirement; letters a-d contain the permissible objective] 
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1.2 What are general exceptions clauses not?  
Apart from the GECs, the treaty practice also knows several other in nature very familiar 
provisions. Even though those seem to be similar to the GECs, it is necessary to distinguish 
these therefrom.  
Firstly, the clauses that largely resemble the GECs are the essential security clauses also 
known as the necessity provisions (hereinafter as the “ESC”).488 Unlike the GECs though, these 
are more frequently incorporated into IIAs and are not as novel to the world of international 
investment law as the GECs are.489 Moreover, there is a considerably larger body of the case 
law provided by the investment tribunals which dealt not only with application but also with 
the interpretation of the ESCs.490  
There are also several important structural and substantial differences to be addressed. Most 
importantly, the purpose and nature of the ESCs is diametrically divergent from the GECs. As 
a matter of fact, the ESCs codify the state’s right to act in situations when the very existence 
thereof is imminently jeopardized, and the states are no longer capable of fulfilling their 
obligations under the respective IIAs.491 
Hence, the wording of the ESCs usually reads: 
“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed: 
a) to require a Contracting Party to furnish any information the disclosure of which is 
deemed contrary to its essential security interests; 
b) to preclude a Contracting Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests, including measures adopted: 
i. in times of war, armed conflict, or other types of emergencies occurred in the territory 
of either Contracting Party or in respect of international relations;  
 
 
488 For the connotation of the term, see NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of 
investment treaties standards of treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 484, 488 et 
seq. 
489 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 42. 
490 For example, Continental, CMS and Enron.  
491 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 43. 
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ii. for the implementation of national policies or in compliance with international 
agreements regarding the non-proliferation of weapons.”492 
As illustrated by this example, the last difference to mention is that, unlike the GECs with 
their “chapeau”493 the ESCs usually do not contain any safeguards from arbitrary and 
discriminatory measures which emphasizes their nature as an ultima racio protection in the 
times of distress.  
Nevertheless, there are also two things that both the ESCs and the GECs have in common. 
Firstly, they both apply to the IIA in question as a whole, exempting the state from any standard 
of investors’ protection;494 secondly, likewise in case of many GECs, some of the IIAs 
incorporate the ESCs directly from the law of WTO.495 
Additionally, one can encounter the so called “carve-outs” which usually include measures 
protecting the financial market of the host state or ensure integrity and stability of the state’s 
financial system; some even exclude all financial services in their entirety.496 Hence, for 
example India – Korea CEPA in its Article 10.2 subsection 7 states: “This Chapter shall not 
apply to measures adopted or maintained by a Party with respect to financial services.”497 In 
addition, IIAs also often expressly carve out taxation measures from the application thereof.498 
As follows from the nature of these “carve-outs” clauses, however, neither these are to be 
regarded as general exceptions for the respective IIAs are not to be applied to the caved-out 
fields in the first place. 
As also mentioned in the previous Chapter, there are the so-called obligation-specific 
exceptions which are often incorporated into the “expropriation” clauses (usually by the means 
 
 
492 Australia-China FTA (2015), Article 16.3, Security Exceptions “Article XXI of GATT 1994 and Article XIV bis 
of GATS are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis.” 
493 For the connotation of the term see the Chapter 2. below. 
494 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of 
treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 484. 
495 For example, Argentina - Qatar BIT (2016), Article 13. 
496 UNCTAD 2010, p. 124. 
497 India - Korea, Republic of CEPA (2009), Article 10.2. 
498 For example, Peru - Singapore BIT (2003), Article 5, subsection 2 “The provisions of this Agreement shall not 
apply to matters of taxation. Such matters shall be governed by any Avoidance of Double Taxation Treaty between 
the two Contracting Parties and the domestic law of each Contracting Party.”  
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of Annexes). These are, however, not supposed to be applicable to the whole treaty in question 
and thus shall not be mistaken for GECs either.  
Lastly, some of the IIAs contain the following wordings:  
“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Agreement that is in 
the public interest, such as measures to meet health, safety or environmental concerns.”499 
These are, nonetheless, mere interpretive guidelines.500 Due to the fact, that the wording of 
these provisions itself addresses the “measures otherwise consistent with” the respective IIAs, 
these provisions have little to no significance and cannot be regarded as exceptions.  
According to Newcombe & Paradell,  
“this type of provision is tautological [and] does not provide additional regulatory 
flexibility for environmental measures. At most it might serve as an interpretive presumption 
that non-discriminatory environmental measures made in good faith do not contravene 
investment obligations.”501 
1.3 Interpretation of general exceptions clauses  
“Exception lies at the crossroads of multiple legal questions.”502 
Indeed, when considering the notion of the exceptions themselves, especially in such 
complex tools as IIAs undoubtedly are, it is necessary to take into consideration all the variables 
and possible repercussions as many is at stake. 
As has been outlined in the introduction of this Part, there is little to no agreement yet on 
the application and interpretation of the GECs within the ambit of international investment law. 
There are many questions related to the existence of the GECs within the ambit of international 
investment law for answering which the GECs have yet to undergo a closer scrutiny of the 
investment tribunals and scholars. Interpretation of the GECs is one of these questions. 
 
 
499 See, for example, India - Korea, Republic of CEPA (2009), Article 10.16; Rwanda - United States of America 
BIT (2008), Article 12 subsection 2; NAFTA, Article 1114. 
500 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of 
treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 509. 
501 Ibid. 
502 BENEDETTO, Saverio Di. International investment law and the environment. Cheltenham : Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2014. P.158-162. 
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For the purposes of the WTO the Appellate Body has defined the GECs as affirming  
“the right of Members to pursue objectives identified in the paragraphs of these provisions 
even if, in doing so, Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in other provisions 
of the respective agreements, provided that all of the conditions set out therein are 
satisfied.”503 Moreover, the Appellate Body has dismissed the narrow interpretation of the 
GECs by the WTO Panels.504 
According to prof. Newcombe such an approach would be preferable also in the field of 
international investment law.505 However, on the contrary, for example Alexia Solomou has 
argued, with reference to the Latin maxim “exceptio est strictissimae applicationis” and on the 
basis of the difference of the GECs from mere reservations, that such exceptions have to be 
applied narrowly.506 
2. TREATY PRACTICE AND EXCEPTIONS CLAUSES 
As mentioned above, only a fraction of all the IIAs that nowadays govern the investment 
relations between states and investors contain the said GECs. 
Yet, the treaty practice concerning the matter is already quite divergent. Not only model 
IIAs of different states vary in the wordings of the GECs but also each of the states have fairly 
inconsistent practice as regards drafting IIAs. 
Many of the IIAs’ GECs are based on Article XX GATT or Article XIV GATS, some are, 
however, combining both, and some are rather sui generis.507 Furthermore, the treaties have 
 
 
503 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 Apr. 2005, para. 291. In NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. 
Law and practice of investment treaties standards of treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 
2009. P. 486. 
504 European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998, para. 104. 
505 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of 
treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 486. 
506 SOLOMOU, Alexia. Chapter 15: Exceptions to a Rule Must Be Narrowly Construed. In: KLINGLER, Josef. 
Between the lines of the Vienna Convention?:canons and other principles of interpretation in public international 
law. Alphen aan den Rijn : Wolters Kluwer, 2019. Pp. 359-386. P. 359.  
507 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 67,81. 
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different approaches to the placement of the GECs as well as the terminology related thereto.508 
Not mentioning the scope of permissible objectives exempted from the application of the 
respective IIAs. 
Nonetheless, even though the treaty practice concerning the GECs is highly disparate there 
are several basic structural elements thereof that are similar throughout most of the IIAs.509 
The wording of the GECs frequently begins with or includes in some of its subsections a 
so called “chapeau” which is a paragraph establishing a set of conditions under which the 
“excluded” measures are adoptable.510 The chapeau sets forth a rule that measures adopted for 
legitimate objectives listed in the subparagraphs of the GEC are not to be 
“applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international [trade or] investment”.511  
That follows exactly the wording of the chapeaux of the GATT and GATS GECs. 
According to the Appellate Body Report US–Shrimp the chapeau encompasses a 
safeguard against arbitrary or discriminatory measures.512 Without such wording installed in 
the head of the GECs objectives, it would lead to  
“permission of one [Member State] to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an exception 
[which would effectively lead] to allowing that [Member State] to degrade its own treaty 
obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other [Member States].” 513  
 
 
508 TITI, Aikaterini. The right to regulate in international investment law. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2014. P. 171; 
BURKE-WHITE, William W., VON STADEN, Andreas. Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The 
Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties. Virginia 
Journal of International Law. U of Penn Law School. 2007, Vol. 48, p. 307-410. P. 325. 
509 Ibid., p. 329. 
510 BARTELS, Lorand. The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A 
Reconstruction? The American Journal of International Law. 2015, Vol. 109, no. 1, pp. 95-125. P.96. 
511 See, for example, Japan-Uruguay BIT (2015), Article 22, which, interestingly, combines general and security 
exceptions; Australia-China FTA (2015), Article 9.8; ASEAN-India IPPA (2014), Article 21; or Latvia-Armenia 
BIT (2005), Article 13. 
512 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp products, Appellate Body Report, 




That makes the chapeau one of the most important parts in the structure of the GECs.514 
Otherwise, incorporating such a clause would be a potentially risky policy which could disrupt 
the very essence of the IIA in question as the investors’ protection thereunder could be 
effectively emptied. Thus, most of the IIAs do install either the chapeau inspired or directly 
borrowed from Article XX GATT or Article XIV GATS or they incorporate other effective 
safeguards against abusive invocation of general exceptions such as notification requirements 
as well as other good faith and non-discrimination requirements.515  
Additionally, as stated by the Appellate Body Report US-Gasoline the purpose of the 
chapeau is not “so much the [assessment of the] questioned measure or its specific contents as 
such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied”.516 It follows that a sober scrutiny 
under a chapeau implies application of the proportionality test which requires that no less severe 
measures are available.517 
The GECs also always contain a wording introducing the set forth objectives under which 
exceptional derogations from the IIA in question are permissible. Usually the phrasing is that 
“nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
Party of measures” which are necessary for the objectives set forth further.518 Such wording 
either follows the “safeguard” part of the chapeau,519 if included, or it is installed in a separate 
subsection.520  
Interestingly, for example prof. Levesque, besides other issues, ruminated over the 
question whether such wording actually implies that the successful invocation of such a clause 
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(2012), Article 5. 
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would exempt a state from its obligation to promptly compensate the aggrieved investor.521 
Prof. Levesque argued that if that was a case it would mean that the states intended to provide 
less protection to the investors than they are provided for by customary international law.522 
This point of view seems understandable, however, if that was the case GECs would basically 
serve no purpose. As a matter of fact, the rationale behind incorporating those clauses is 
precisely the states’ aspiration to exempt themselves from liability for the breach of IIA 
resulting from pursuance of miscellaneous policy objectives.523 Moreover, as was concluded 
by Alvarez & Birke, nothing prevents the parties to, at the conclusion of IIAs, freely limit 
investor protections, including those under customary international law.524 
Before proceeding to the permissible objectives, it is imperative to mention the so called 
“nexus requirement” which is also very commonly used in the GECs. Such requirement resides 
in the fact that in order to be covered by the GEC the challenged measures, otherwise in 
contravention with the corresponding IIA, must be sufficiently related to the permissible 
objectives specified therein.525 The phrase most frequently used is “necessary to” or “which it 
considers necessary” to achieve any of the objectives listed in the clause. Further wordings use 
words such as “relating/related to”, “directed to”, “imposed for”, and others. Only very few 
IIAs lack such nexus requirement.526 Followingly, the rigidity of the nexus requirement varies 
throughout different IIAs and the looser it is the greater regulatory freedom it guarantees.527  
The disunity in the wordings of the nexus requirement in IIAs and certain level of 
ambiguity of the term itself have naturally necessitated a closer scrutiny within the practice of 
 
 
521 LÉVESQUE, Céline. The inclusion of GATT Article XX exceptions in IIAs: a potentially risky policy. In: 
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104 
 
the investment tribunals (as well as WTO Panels and the Appellate body) which is addressed 
below. 
Lastly, the heart of the GECs are the permissible objectives. When assessing the 
challenged measures, those that fall under such permissible objectives could be inconsistent 
with the other provisions of the IIA in question and still would not trigger the states’ liability 
therefor.  
The number and nature of these permissible objectives vary in different IIAs. Usually, the 
states incorporate health or environment-related, compliance with laws, protection of public 
order and morals objectives.528 One of the mostly occurring objectives is taxation as that is 
deemed to be an essential attribute of the state’s fiscal sovereignty.529. Hence the taxation 
measures are often completely and unconditionally exempted from the application of the 
respective IIAs either under the GECs or in another similar provisions.  
To illustrate the foregoing, the following provides with the wordings of GECs of several 
IIAs in order to compare the structure and the scope thereof. IIAs are specifically chosen in 
order to cover all the different kinds thereof as well as different types of the GECs incorporated 
therein. Thus, the following elaborates more on IIAs containing GECs based on the Article XX 
GATT, Article XIV GATS, both those articles and sui generis exception clauses respectively. 
2.1 General exceptions clauses inspired by the WTO law 
To this day, GECs that are either based on or incorporate the wordings of Article XX 
GATT and Article XIV GATS are prevailing in the practice of IIAs.530  
These GECs are all very familiar and mostly differ in the permissible objectives under 
which the states’ measures may be inconsistent with the IIA in question. It always depends on 
the arrangements of the particular states which can opt for a large list of exceptions depending 
on their economic backgrounds or keep the generally excepted objectives straight and simple. 
 
 
528 Moldova, Republic of - United Arab Emirates BIT (2017), Article 12; Burundi - Turkey BIT (2017), Article 5; 
Mauritius-Pakistan (1997), Article 12. 
529 WALDE, Thomas, KOLO, Abba. Investor-State Disputes: The Interface Between Treat-Based International 
Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty. Intertax,. 2007, 35(8/9), pp. 424–449. P. 431. 
530 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 67. 
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Usually, such GECs contain (apart from the chapeau and the nexus requirement) 
permissible objectives related to or necessary for “protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, or the environment; the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural 
resources; maintenance of public order,” etc. 531 
Some of the BITs and FTAs even took the incorporation of the foregoing clauses a step 
further. Those IIAs do not contain the WTO’s exceptions wording therein but rather opted for 
an incorporation thereof by reference.532 
Lastly, it bares mentioning the CETA agreement which is also based on the WTO law. 
This agreement is deemed one of the most elaborated tools as regards affirming and securing 
the state’s regulatory flexibility as well as the permissible objectives under the exceptions 
therein.533  
 
2.2 Variedness of general exceptions clauses in some IIAs  
Apart from the aforementioned IIAs, there are many others that contain sundry GECs not 
inspired by GATT or GATS the variety of which is enormous.  
Such a vast divergence of the wordings of GECs among IIAs is on one hand 
understandable as all the states have different economical and legal backgrounds (not to 
mention the historical ones) as well as the objectives followed. On the other hand, however, the 
inconsistency is precisely the issue that might cause troubles over the time especially with such 
a new phenomenon as the GECs without any doubt are. 
This Section thus provides with a peek into the matter by going through several 
specifically distinctive IIAs. 
To begin with, Canada-Latvia BIT incorporated a convoluted combination of different 
exceptions throughout its wording. Firstly, there are Articles IV and VI entitled “Exceptions” 
 
 
531 Burundi - Turkey BIT (2017), Article 5; Moldova, Republic of - United Arab Emirates BIT (2017), Article 12; 
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Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Article 2101. 
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and “Miscellaneous Exceptions” respectively which for most part only exclude application of 
several articles to non-conforming measures, procurement, subsidies, or provide for possibility 
to derogate from intellectual property rights, while also completely exempting investments in 
cultural industries form the application of this BIT.534 
On top of this, this BIT also contains Article XVII termed “Application and General 
Exceptions” which in fact partly incorporated the wording of Article XX GATT, but it also 
incorporated further permissible objectives. Moreover, the subsection 2. of this article contains 
a following wording: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting 
Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this 
Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is 
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.” Which, as implied before, is 
deemed merely “interpretive guidelines” without any particular significance and not the 
exceptions.535 
Interestingly, there are several IIAs from the 90’s which could be considered forerunners of 
the security and health exceptions in the contemporary GECs of IIAs. Those treaties usually 
include articles on prohibitions and restrictions which read 
“the provisions of this Agreement shall not in any way limit the right of either Contracting 
Party to apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind or take any other action which is directed 
to the protection of its essential security interests, or to the protection of public health or the 
prevention of diseases and pests in animals or plants.”536 
Lastly, it seems worth mentioning the Russian approach to the matter of GECs and to 
conclusion of IIAs in general. It is worth mentioning not only due to the content but rather for 
the form in which it is regulated. 
Historically, there were two model BITs issued by the Russian Federation – one in 1992, 
the second in 2001.537 The treaties neither contained any general exceptions or even national 
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security exception nor it exempted any policy areas (such as taxation, financial services, public 
procurement, or subsidies) from the scope thereof.538 
However, in reaction to the latest developments Russian government issued Guidelines as 
of 30 September 2016 thereby specifically terminating the effect of both the Model BITs.  
The Guidelines are intended to “define the distinctivenesses of conducting negotiations and 
concluding international treaties of the Russian Federation on the promotion and protection of 
investments”.539 In other words, instead of setting forth a rigid set of provisions the Guidelines 
are intended to provide the deputies with certain borders within which they may negotiate and 
conclude IIAs. 
Contrary to the two Model BITs, the Guidelines contain several rather interesting provisions 
regarding the matter of exceptions specifically related to the “expropriation” provisions.  
Firstly, Article 25 states that the expropriation provision should not cover security measures 
that are applied to the investor’s investment by the investigative and judicial authorities of the 
party in which the investment was made.540 Secondly, according to Article 26 expropriation 
provision should not apply to measures related to the establishment and collection of taxes and 
fees, provided those are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. 541 Under Articles 28 and 29 
Expropriation should not include customs regulations and compulsory licenses in respect of 
intellectual property. 542 
Finally, Article 27 considers events of natural disasters, accidents, epidemics, epizootics 
and other similar circumstances of an emergency nature in which the cases of requisition are 
also exempted from the application of the expropriation provision. However, in those cases it 
is specifically stated, that reimbursement is due with the restitution of an investment upon 
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In conclusion, as has been demonstrated in tis Subsection the states have already approached 
the matter of incorporation of the GECs into their IIAs with a significant amount of creativity. 
Only the course of time and the prospective disputes will show how durable and effective these 
wording are. 
3. APPROACH TO GENERAL EXCEPTIONS CLAUSES IN JURISPRUDENCE 
Since the treaty practice regarding inclusion of the GECs into IIAs is quite recent, the 
ISDS practice has not had a proper opportunity to react thereto and thus produce a sufficient 
number of decisions which would satisfactorily resolve the above outlined questions. The more 
it relates to the application of such clauses in the cases of indirect expropriation. 
In fact, the tribunals will be sooner or later in full brought before miscellaneous issues 
which stem from such a treaty practice. First and foremost, the investment tribunals will have 
to address the questions related to the delineation of what exactly is the relationship between 
GECs and other means of securing the state’s right to regulate; more precisely the obligation-
specific exceptions, IIAs’ Annexes regarding indirect expropriation and the police powers 
doctrine. Alternatively, when taking into account what has been mentioned before, the tribunals 
will also have to decide upon the exact scope of applicability of the GECs; mostly with 
emphasizes on cases of indirect expropriation. Additionally, following the discussion on the 
relationship between the right to regulate and the duty to compensate, it is also far from clear 
whether the GECs will be interpreted as exempting the states from liability to compensate when 
adopting expropriatory measures; if affirmative, whether it would not disrupt the international 
investors’ protection while shifting the current imbalance between the investors’ and states’ 
rights the opposite way. 
Notwithstanding, as most of the IIAs that contain GECs incorporated those from or were 
inspired by the WTO’s GATT or GATS, it seems rather worthwhile to mention key issues 
discussed within the WTO Panels’ decisions concerning the matter. 
Naturally, there are certain limitations to the application of the WTO’s case law within the 
practice of the investment tribunals. Primarily, the investment law and trade law are utterly 
divergent spheres regulating dissimilar relationships.544 After all, both the international trade 
and foreign direct investment are governed by different legal documents, they also differ in the 
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nature of the rules and principles which they are based upon, while also having their own 
specialized dispute settlement systems.545 Despite this, the WTO jurisprudence dealing with the 
GATT and GATS exceptions might be useful and relevant to the investment tribunals when 
interpreting such clauses in IIAs, more precisely when determining the ordinary meaning of the 
individual terms used therein.546 In fact, several major investment cases to date have already 
referred to the jurisprudence of the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body at least to define a 
reading of national treatment or necessity requirement under an IIA.547 
As regards the WTO’s approach to the exception clauses, its case law adopted two stances 
thereon.548 At first, for example, in Canada-Ice Cream & Yoghurt the Panel observed that not 
only “a contracting party invoking an exception […] bore the burden of proving that it had met 
all of the conditions of that exception” but also that those “exceptions were to be interpreted 
narrowly”.549 Similarly decided the Panel in the EC-Meat Products.550  
However, the Appellate Body has found that such a narrow approach to the exceptions 
clauses does not correspond to the nature of the GEC.551 
Followingly, in the two WTO cases US-Shrimp and US-Gasoline the Appellate Body 
concluded that a restrictive test applied in those cases by the Panels cannot find any support 
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either within the wording of the chapeau or within the exceptions claimed.552 Moreover, the 
Appellate body has also stressed the need for rather a balanced approach to the exceptions 
altogether as the broad possibility to invoke exceptions could disrupt the rights of the 
contracting parties protected under GATT.553 
Speaking about the invocation of the exceptions, the WTO Appellate Body has also 
addressed the means of assessing the challenged measures under the exception clause.554 
According to the Appellate Body the scrutiny of the challenged measures is based on a two-
prong test.555 Firstly the challenged measures have to be assessed from the perspective of the 
justified exceptions listed in the subparagraphs of the GEC, i.e. fulfil the nexus requirement; 
secondly, these measures have to pass the “chapeau test” which exacts therefrom that they are 
not arbitrary or discriminatory.556 
And as regards the nexus requirement, permissible objectives and other key terms 
commonly appearing in the GECs, the WTO bodies have issued several important decisions 
providing the interpretation thereof.557 As the purpose of this thesis necessitates, the discussion 
will shortly stop by the jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of the nexus requirement for 
it was referred to on several occasions by the investment tribunals. 
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Firstly, it is important to mention that, as the Panel also observed in US – Gasoline, “it 
[is] not the necessity of the policy goal that [is] to be examined, but whether or not [the 
challenged measure] is necessary […]”558 Otherwise, the Panels (or, as the case may be, the 
investment tribunals) would subject to their scrutiny the state’s internal processes resting in 
regulations of their internal policies which in turn would mean questioning the state’s 
sovereignty by extrinsic entities.559  
According to the GATT Secretariat, the “necessity” requirement has been introduced in 
the case US-Section 337560 where the Panel stated that a challenged measure cannot be justified 
under Article XX if there is “an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to 
employ and which is not inconsistent with the [other] provisions.” 561 Accordingly, it has 
observed that in order to comply with the necessity test the measures have to “entail the least 
degree of inconsistency with the [other] provisions.”562  
Additionally, the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef case has 
concluded that also the extent to which the challenged measure “contributed to the to the 
realization of the end pursued” shall be considered.563 
Hence, the WTO Panels jointly with the Appellate Body have created a two folded test 
which in the first round balances the pursued objective and the measures adopted for its 




558 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Panel Report, WT/DS2/R, adopted 29 
January 1996, para 6.22. 
559 For the connotation of the term and further discussion see the Part “Right to Regulate and Indirect 
Expropriation” of this thesis. 
560 GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATT Article XX, Paragraphs (b),(d), and (g). Note by 
the Secretariat, WT/CTE/W/203, adopted on 8 March 2002, para. 36. 
561 United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Panel Report, 36S/345, adopted on 7 November 1989, 
para. 5.26. 
562 Ibid.. 
563 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Appelate Body Reports, 
WT/DS161/AB/R and WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted on para 10 January 2001. 163. 
564 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 265 
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Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that the rigidity of this test will vary depending 
on the wording of the GEC at hand.565t 
Moving to the decisions of the investment tribunals, several of them have already had 
recourse to the WTO case law regarding the matter. One of these was the tribunal in Continental 
deciding under the Argentina-United States BIT. More precisely, this tribunal has addressed 
the notion of “nexus requirement” and the applicability of the WTO case law within the ambit 
of international investment law. Before proceeding further, however, it is important to 
emphasize that this tribunal has dealt with the security exceptions within the circumstances of 
severe economic crisis and not with GEC which relates to the general welfare policies.566 
As regards the nexus requirement, the tribunal primarily held that the WTO case law shall 
be drawn upon rather than customary international law due to the fact that the clause in question 
which contained the security exceptions was formulated similarly as the one contained in 
GATT.567 The tribunal then proceeded with deliberation upon the necessity test for which it 
relied mostly on the decisions of the WTO Appellate Body and Panels (which are also discussed 
above). 
Further, the tribunal in S.D. Myers has dealt precisely with the application of exceptions 
in the cases of the alleged expropriation.568 In this case, the tribunal has found that even though 
 
 
565 It will always depend whether the nexus requirement is expressed by the words “necessary”, “related to” or 
other phrasing. Thus, for example, as regards the wording “related to” the GATT Panel in Canada – Herring and 
Salmon has there pointed out to the distinctive features of the GATT Article XX subparagraphs where some of 
them included the wording “necessary” of “essential” while subparagraph (g) included merely “relating to” which 
has to be taken into account; 
Canada - Measures Affecting Exports Of Unprocessed Herring And Salmon, Panel Report, L/6268 - 35S/98, 
adopted on 22 March 1988, para. 4.6. 
566 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 
2008, para. 181. 
567 Ibid., para. 192. 
“With regard to the necessity test required for the application of the BIT, for the reasons stated above relating to 
the different role of Art. XI and of the defense of necessity in customary international law, the Tribunal does not 
share the opinion that “the treaty thus becomes inseparable from the customary law standard insofar as to the 
conditions for the operation of the state of necessity are concerned,” as stated in the Enron Case and submitted 
also by the Claimant. Since the text of Art. XI derives from the parallel model clause of the U.S. FCN treaties and 
these treaties in turn reflect the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947,291 the Tribunal finds it more appropriate 
to refer to the GATT and WTO case law which has extensively dealt with the concept and requirements of necessity 
in the context of economic measures derogating to the obligations contained in GATT, rather than to refer to the 
requirement of necessity under customary international law.” 
568 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 289 et seq. 
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the GATT Article XX-like in the NAFTA Article 1410 provided for general exceptions 
regarding the reasonable measures related to the protection of investors, maintenance of safety, 
financial system and other permissible objectives, the ban on PCB exports nevertheless could 
not be justified.569 
Finally, and most importantly, one of the latest decisions that has contributed to solving 
the issues of application of the GECs within the jurisprudence of the investment tribunals is one 
issued by the Bear Creek tribunal. Here, the tribunal has dealt with revocation by the means of 
enacting a Supreme Decree 083 of the authorization given to the Claimant in order to acquire, 
own and operate its mining concessions.570 The representatives of Peru, the Respondent, have 
argued that such a measure could not be expropriatory as issuance of the Supreme Decree 083 
was a legitimate exercise of the state’s right to regulate under the police powers doctrine. 
This argumentation, however, was not upheld by the tribunal. To the contrary, the tribunal 
held that since the GEC in Article 2201 of the Canada – Peru FTA had a conclusive list of 
permissible objectives and the Supreme Decree 083 did not fall under any of them, no additional 
exception could be applied in this case.571 
Hence, the tribunal concluded that “here is […] no need to enter into the discussion 
between the Parties regarding the jurisprudence concerning any police power exception for 
measures addressed to investments.” 
It thus follows that the relationship between the GECs and the police powers doctrine 
could be deemed to be in accordance with the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali. Hence, 
in cases of incorporation of the GECs into IIAs no additional permissible objectives will be 
recognized under the notion of the police powers doctrine. However, it needs to be reiterated 
 
 
569 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 298; in: NEWCOMBE, 
Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of treatment. Alphen aan den 
Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 505. 
570 Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, 30 August 2017, 
para. 149. 
571 Ibid. para. 473.  
“The Tribunal considers that already the title of Article 2201 “General Exceptions” shows that otherwise Chapter 
Eight (investment) remains applicable including its Articles 812 and, by the express footnote to the title of Article 
812, as well as Article 812.1. Further, the list is not introduced by any wording (e.g. “such as”) which could be 
understood that it is only exemplary. It must therefore be understood to be an exclusive list. Also in substance, in 
view of the very detailed provisions of the FTA regarding expropriation (Article 812 and Annex 812.1) and 
regarding exceptions in Article 2201 expressly designated to “Chapter Eight (Investment)”, the interpretation of 
the FTA must lead to the conclusion that no other exceptions from general international law or otherwise can be 
considered applicable in this case.” 
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that the outcomes of the investment tribunals’ decision-making process will always hugely 
depend on the exact wording of the GEC in question. 
And even though the GECs are by nature intended to provide greater flexibility to the 
states in the exercise of their regulatory power, in this context, according to prof. Newcome “it 
remains unclear whether general exceptions in fact provide greater regulatory flexibility for 
host state measures that affect foreign investment and investors.”572 
 
 
572 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of 




In the course of the research related to the matters addressed by this thesis it became clear 
that before proceeding to respective answers to the research questions set in the beginning of 
the thesis it is necessary to mention several important issues common for all the concepts 
discussed above. 
Firstly, what has been encountered throughout the research is a highly inconsistent 
terminology not only as regards the concept of indirect expropriation and its subcategories but 
also different aspects of the state’s right to regulate as well as the GECs. Thus, the first step is 
to stop labelling and opt for a comprehensive and uniform approach which would work with 
the content of the notions related to the matter. This would be possible to achieve by a complex 
set of guidelines which would be created by the scholars and arbitrators from different 
jurisdictions.  
Furthermore, which is partly related to the previously mentioned issue, is the 
terminological inconsistency within the treaty practice. One for all, the “nexus requirement” 
fully encompasses this problem. As has been discussed in the last Part of this thesis, in order 
for the measures to be protected under the GEC they have to fall under one of the permissible 
objectives included therein while fulfilling the nexus requirement. However, the rigidity of the 
wordings which embody this requirement is very divergent (sometimes this requirement is 
absent at all) which in prospective disputes would lead to very inconsistent rulings.  
In addition, what seems the most troublesome is the decision-making practice of the 
investment tribunals. It is utopian to expect that the tribunals would be deciding all the claims 
similarly for they are limited by the respective IIAs and thus the discrepancies in the investment 
arbitration practice are inevitable. However, it is not that unreasonable to expect the tribunals 
to make their decisions carried out in a mutually coincident manner – at least when applying 
different tests for assessment of indirect expropriation. 
Based on the foregoing, the concluding remarks will now address the research questions. 
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QUESTION 1: Which method shall be applied by international investment tribunals in the 
scrutiny of the challenged state’s measures in cases of indirect expropriation? 
Setting aside any labelling and word-splitting a substantive question is – how shall the 
tribunals approach the challenged regulatory measures? 
From the foregoing, it appears that the tribunals have already partly answered this question 
by including more aspects into their consideration of the indirect expropriation cases. 
Essentially, the method to be applied has to be founded on a “step-by-step” test consisting of 
separation and gradual assessment of different aspects of the case. 
Following the tests introduced by Paulson & Douglas or by Isakoff,573 the proper method 
of assessment would comprise of the following steps. 
Primarily, the tribunals shall scrutinize the effect which the challenged measures had on 
the respective investor. If the effect is found to be substantial enough, the tribunal proceeds 
with the second step, otherwise it dismisses the claim. 
In the second step shall be applied the police powers doctrine where the purpose of the 
challenged measures would be taken into consideration. 
As the third step shall be applied the proportionality test which requires that the measures 
are closely related to the pursued legitimate policy, capable of reaching such and the least 
restrictive of the possible measures. By which the notion of the police powers doctrine will be 
proportionally restricted to a genuine legitimate and necessary exercise of the regulatory 
activity. 
Lastly, it seems also apposite to also consider any commitments that the state has 
undertaken towards the investors in question, i.e. the legitimate expectations of investors. 
It is, however, important to reiterate, that such a test cannot stem from a practice of the 
investment tribunals. As was concluded in SGS case “There is no hierarchy of international 
tribunals, and even if there were, there is no good reason for allowing the first tribunal in time 




573 See MONTT, Santiago. State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration; Global Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in the BIT Generation. 2012. Oxford and Portland : Hart Publishing. P. 236; ISAKOFF, Peter 
David. Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for International Investments. Global business law review. 
2013, 3(2), pp. 189-209. P. 204. 
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QUESTION 2: What are the possible means the states can utilize in pursuance of 
recalibration of the relationship between their regulatory flexibility and investors’ 
protection? 
Apart from the GECs which will be addressed immediately afterwards, it seems that states 
do have at least one other mean of protecting their regulatory flexibility within the ambit of the 
international investment protection. 
Given that IIAs represent the fundamental source of the decision-making practice of 
international investment tribunals while also limiting its scope, the states have a great possibility 
to influence the outcomes of such practice by formulating clearer rules and definitions of the 
ambiguous concepts and terms included therein.  
Hence, the latest practice of including explanatory provisions or annexes concerning the 
“expropriation” clauses seems very convenient and least invasive way to reintegrate the balance 
between the public and private rights into the investor-state relationship. Moreover, these 
provisions often set forth the applicable method of the indirect expropriation assessment.574 
Unfortunately, many states (especially the ones against which no claim has been yet 
brought before international investment tribunals) opted for generic, i.e. less elaborated, treaty 
wordings leaving the faith of their regulatory flexibility solely to the discretion of the 
investment tribunals. 
QUESTION 3: Do the GECs have any practical applicability within the ambit of 
international investment law? 
At the time being, it still remains unclear whether inclusion of the GECs reaffirms and 
strengthens the states’ regulatory powers or, in fact, imposes limitations thereupon.575 
Based on the recent decision of the Bear Creek tribunal, it seems, that the GECs, if drafted 
exhaustively with no space for the tribunals’ discretion, would be perceived as rather limiting 
in comparison with the police powers doctrine.576 
 
 
574 See, for instance, China – Republic of Korea FTA (2015), Annex 12-B; Australia – Indonesia CEPA (2019), 
Annex 14-B; Argentina – Japan BIT (2018), Art. 11, Section 3; China – United Republic of Tanzania BIT (2013), 
Art.6. 
575 NEWCOMBE, Andrew and PARADELL, Lluis. Law and practice of investment treaties standards of 
treatment. Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2009. P. 505. 




Moreover, due to their nature, the GECs are essentially prone to a mala fide invocation 
which suggests that the investment tribunals shall remain a prudent and thoroughgoing 
approach in the assessment of cases where the states claim their measures to be covered by the 
exceptions clause.577  
In conclusion, international investment law is yet to elaborate a clear stance towards the 
phenomenon of the GECs. Followingly, only time and decision-making practice of the 
investment tribunals will show whether this operation residing in transplantation the trade law 
GECs into the body of international investment law was indeed a successful campaign. 
 
 
577 SABANOGULLARI, Levent. General exception clauses in international investment law: the recalibration of 
investment agreements via WTO-based flexibilities. Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2018. P. 171 et seq. 
119 
 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Author Reference 
ALVAREZ José E.  The public international law regime governing international 
investment. The Hague : Hague Academy of International Law, 2011. 
ISBN 978-90-04-18682-8. 
BALAŠ, Vladimír and 
ŠTURMA, Pavel. 
Nové mezinárodní dohody na ochranu investic. Praha : Wolters 
Kluwer, 2018. ISBN 978-80-7598-100-4. 
BENEDETTO, 
Saverio Di. 
International investment law and the environment. Cheltenham : 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014. ISBN 978-0857936646. 
BISHOP, R. Doak, 
James CRAWFORD 
and W. Michael 
REISMAN. 
Foreign investment disputes: cases, materials, and commentary. 2nd 





REDFERN, Alan and 
HUNTER, Martin. 
Redfern and Hunter on international arbitration. 6th ed. Oxford, 
United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-
0198714255. 
BROWN, Chester. Commentaries on selected model investment treaties. Oxford : Oxford 
University Press, 2013. ISBN 978-0-19-964519-0. 
BÜCHELER, 
Gebhard. 
Proportionality in investor-state arbitration. 1st ed. Oxford, United 
Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2015. ISBN: 9780198724339. 
CHOUKROUNE 
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